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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
This thesis was begun in 1999, and was expected to be completed in May of 2000.
Since then, unforeseen life circumstances interrupted the process. The final phase of this
author's study is occurring in the fall of 2005.
Many extraordinary things have dramatically changed the face of the world since 1999. In
1999 Mr. Vladimir Putin was not yet the president of Russia. At the same time, Mr. George W.
Bush was not yet the President of the United States.
The Towers of the World Trade Center were still a significant standing symbol of New
York City. The tragedy of the September 11 victims, the hostages in the Moscow Theater, the
massacre of children in Beslan, Chechen-Ingushetia, and the blasts in Spain and London had
not yet turned our somewhat peaceful world into dynamite.
During the twentieth century, terrorism was a significant issue, but not yet the dominating
force. The war in Iraq had not yet been conceived.
With the turn of the Twenty-first century, not only did the millennium turn, but we, the
peoples of the Universe, changed drastically, dramatically and forever.
The hurricanes Wilma, Rita, Katrina, Jeanne, Frances (some of which the writer of this
study personally experienced), the devastating tsunami, earthquakes, mudslides, and all the
other natural disasters that have recently influenced human well-being and the global
economy, are perhaps the dramatic warning signs of Mother Nature.
2We walked into the twenty-first century losing one of the most significant values of human
life, our sense of security and hope for a safe, peaceful future.
Greed, stinginess, parsimoniousness, tightfistedness, avarice, craving for power, money,
gold and black gold (oil), racial, social, political and religious intolerance gave rise to: oil for
food1, oil for money, workforce for money, oil and money for lives, and the religious outrage
of hate-driven terrorists who destabilized a peaceful world.
This study will deal with the above-mentioned tools of exchange: money and its equivalent
(in any existing type, shape or form), and the means of legal and judicial enforcement utilized
to neutralize currency's devastating effect on humans - rich and poor.
This paper will outline the dynamics of money utilized as a means of violating legal
demands, rules, laws, regulations and requirements and the corrupting power of money
resourcing from specially organized multilateral financial institutions including but not limited
to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The main goal of these
institutions is to fight for peace by fighting against hunger and poverty and by helping to
promote negotiation, consensus, free trade and free exchange. The dangers of a corrupted
Russian government, officials, financial and banking systems, supplied with the monetary help
of the World Bank and the IMF, all pose threats to the safety of the world. One might presume
that for the public good there should be a somewhat fair distribution of one of the most
1 For a comprehensive analysis of attempt to corrupt Russian Government and Putin's Cabinet,
and misuse of the international aid by Saddam Hussein, see MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFFS OF
THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., REPORT ON OIL ALLOCATIONS GRANTED TO THE
Russian PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL (Comm. Print 2005), available at
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/PSIRussianPresidentialCounselReport.pdf [hereinafter OIL
ALLOCATIONS REPORT].
3important tools for rebuilding human lives – money, as well as a very strict accountability for
using it and severe punishment for its misuse.
In July 1999, the author of this thesis was a speaker on gender and inequity topics for the
Prime Week at the World Bank.
She attended the financial session of the forum as well. She was fortunate enough to be
able to question publicly very highly ranked representatives of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the following:
 It is well known that World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
issued a significant number of loans of different sizes and amounts to Russia
with specific purposes and to complete specific programs. As a citizen of
Russia, the author believed that neither the money received from the World
Bank nor the money from the IMF was spent in a way or with a purpose that
would have helped the Russian economy to recover and be restructured to
the good of the people. Thus, the goal of decreasing the poverty level was
never reached. Therefore, the author's question was: “Where is the money
loaned to the Russian Government, and how might the World Bank and the
IMF control where the money went? How was the money spent? What was
the final product or result of use of the particular loan amounts?”
The answer from the World Bank and IMF was, “We are having trouble controlling and
tracking how the particular country is spending our money and utilizing our help.”
“The problem is that when the Russian Government receives the money, it is mixed with
the country’s own money.” (This was the response from the Russian Government under
Yeltsin to the World Bank and IMF).
“In addition, we (the World Bank and IMF), have no strong legal means, tools, power,
rights, or regulations to demand a report, as check how a particular country and its government
is spending money supplied to them by the World Bank and IMF, due to sovereignty issues. ”
What an interesting answer!
4If a citizen went to obtain a mortgage loan or business loan to purchase equipment or to
start a new line of products, the bank would be in legal and procedural standing to check on
how well and properly a person was using the credit received. Moreover, if instead the
individual spent the money for vacationing in Hawaii or the Caribbean, the Seychelles Islands
or the Maldives, or used the funds for another unintended target, the borrower would be in
direct violation of the loan agreement, and would immediately be asked to return the money
borrowed.
A simplification perhaps; however, isn't it logical that when millions or sometimes billions
of dollars are distributed on an international level to a country by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), stricter procedures and legal requirements and regulations
would be in place to track the path and the route of the money loaned? If the money is serving
its intended purpose, an accounting should be provided as to how well and properly the goals
of the specifically financed program have been achieved by the government of the sovereign
country or by authorized subsidies.
Curiously, it appears that the issue of sovereignty is preventing the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) from controlling the expenditures of the funds they
disburse to a particular country. The World Bank and the IMF officials are admitting that this
dilemma still, in 2005, hasn't found its appropriate resolution.
As a Russian citizen in year 1999, the writer of this thesis appeal to the IMF and the World
Bank NOT to keep providing funds to the Russian government without a stipulation that it
report a plan for achieving goals, and for measuring and reporting on achievement of goals; so
that the government would be transparent and accountable for any misuse of funds. It should
5be proven beyond reasonable doubt that money is disbursed properly and directly, and that it is
used and invested as originally intended.
The IMF and the World Bank briefed the press and public attending that there is a present
and ongoing investigation on the use of loans to the Russian Federation from the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
A month and a half after the briefing at the end of August 1999, the news emerged that the
Bank of New York was engaged in money-laundering schemes with Russian mobs and
officials through a relationship with the Russian affiliate banks. Natasha Gurfinkel
Kagalovsky, a Bank of New York executive, resigned in October 1999 under the pressure of a
federal investigation into possible money laundering that occurred through accounts at the
Bank of New York. The Bank of New York was eager to expand its interests in the Russian
market through its affiliate Incombank (which collapsed in October 1998), and was one of the
Bank of New York’s most profitable customers. In February 2000, Lucy Edwards, another
Bank of New York executive, and her husband pleaded guilty to their roles in a money-
transfer scheme that washed from $7 to $10 billion from Russia through the bank of New York
in the period from 1995 until 1999. The Bank of New York cooperated with the investigation
and was never criminally charged in connection with this investigation.2 The scandal with the
Bank of New York is serving as an example of money laundering.3
2 Colleen DeBaise, Appeals Court Reinstates Embezzlement Suit Vs Bank Of NY, DOW JONES
NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 15, 2002, available at http://russianlaw.org/dj011502.htm (last visited
Nov. 27, 2005).
3 Role of the U.S. Correspondent Banking in International Money Laundering: Hearing Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong.
273 (2001) (appendix), available at http://www.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate12sh107.html.
6The washed billions could easily include money loaned by the World Bank and the IMF to
the Russian Government.4 Was there a serious misuse of international help to Russia while
billions of dollars were flushing away overseas through the Russian banking system the World
Bank and IMF were determined to improve? Were mafia, corrupt politicians, and highly
ranked officials of Russia in control of international loans, help, aid and assistance? This study
will unfold some proven facts. Moreover, extensive investigative research by American
legislators launched at the end of the 1990s revealed numerous astonishing facts regarding
corruption and the misuse of international funds by Russian officials.5 The Report entered the
public domain around September 2000. In 1999 the author of this work alleged that the
schemes regarding the misuse of international money by the Russian government would
become matters of public knowledge and concern very soon (X); that drastic and unexpected
changes in political power in Russia would happen at the end of 1999 or the beginning of 2000
(Y); and that Russia would march toward a new twenty- first century type of dictatorship (Z)6.
As of 2005, sadly, XYZ had happened. Corruption has unfolded; political power smoothly
went from Yeltsin to Putin.7 Putin proved to be a dictator with a democratic face or a new
form of democrat with a dictatorial attitude.8
4 For a comprehensive analysis of the Clinton Administration’s actions toward transitioning
Russia, see Russia's Road to Corruption, Speaker’s Advisory Group on Russia, 106 th Cong.
(2000) (presentation by Rep. Christopher Cox, Chairman, House Policy Comm.), available at
http://www.fas.org/news/russia/2000/russia/index.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2005) [hereinafter
Road to Corruption].
5 Id.
6 Russia's Transition to Democracy and U.S.- Russia Relations: Unfinished Business: Hearing on
H.R. 108-54 Before the Subcomm. on Europe of the Comm. on International Relations, 108th
Cong. 1 (2003), available at http://wwwc.house.gov/ international_relations/108/89668.PDF.
7 GEORGE W. BRESLAUER, GORBACHEV AND YELTSIN AS LEADERS (2002).
8 LILLA SHEVTSOVA, PUTIN’S RUSSIA (2003).
7As an ordinary person, the author of this study didn't have all resources available to the
World Bank and IMF, or the House of Representatives Committee of the United States Senate,
or other international institutions and governmental agencies of the United States and Russia
to unfold the flaws of the Russian government and the Russian financial market and banking
system. However, at the end of the 90s it surfaced that very serious ongoing misuse of
international loans by the Russian Government is occurring. On the other hand, internally, the
Russian Government used well-concealed lies to the Russian population and proclaimed that
the World Bank and IMF are not willing to help the country in times of crisis (1991-1995),
while the Government and Mr. Yeltsin personally as President, as well as Mr. Chubais' as an
“architect” of privatization, Mr. Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister, and other members of the
Cabinet robbed and stole from their own people whom they were sworn to serve.9
Some of the most significant reasons for ongoing violations were: a vacuum in legislation
with regard to the absence of new laws and regulations, and with regard to members of the
legislative branch the ability to understand the urgent necessity of the open market culture and
society in a country in transition;10 the absence of a system of checks and balances; an extreme
lack of legal enforcement not only in Russia, but also, as became plain, internationally, and in
particular within the World Bank and IMF structure; the lack of readiness of both the World
Bank and the IMF to meet the demands of a new era for appropriate changes in their activities
and functions, and to address urgent issues. Historically, a weak legal system and powerless
9 Road to Corruption, supra note 4, Executive Summary.
10 Id.
8judicial branch in Russia11 and, therefore, the absence of a system of checks and balances, led
to the criminal intent and criminal misuse of international funds, which puts in jeopardy the
peaceful existence of an extremely powerful country itself. Russia out of balance can pose
direct danger to the rest of the world with its sizeable military, space, defense and nuclear
arsenal. Unfortunately, the World Bank and the IMF did not pay enough attention to the
Russia's lack of checks and balances, and in 1991-1999 there were not enough special
programs developed or financed to help to build, improve, or polish the system of checks and
balances in Russia, nor was there adequate financing of programs to conduct substantial and
widely scaled legal and judicial reforms reflecting and supporting rapid changes occurring in
all walks of newly reforming and transitioning Russian society, governmental entities,
financial, banking, commercial and private sectors.12 The World Bank and The IMF did not
place special conditions on the chain of tranches of money to the Russian Federation requiring
the government to work rapidly toward improvement of legislation, implementation of
legislation, strengthening of the judicial branch or legal enforcement. Those elements did not
appear to be priorities for the World Bank and the IMF at the time.
1.2. Purpose of the Study
The present paper will examine how the policies of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) influenced the transition of post-Soviet Russia toward democracy and
an open society. The study will discuss how policies have changed over time, how the misuse
of international money became possible and how that misuse later unfolded. The study will
concentrate on, and will show that ignorance of the rule of law, disregard for legal
11 Leon Aron, Russia Reinvents the Rule of Law, RUSSIAN OUTLOOK, Mar. 20, 2002,
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.13781/pub_detail.asp (last visited Nov. 27, 2005)
[hereinafter RUSSIAN OUTLOOK].
9enforcement, and failure to adequately finance relevant legal reform projects diminished what
could have been a bright opportunity for Russia to become a full-scale democracy and a full-
scale open society. Further, this study will provide some suggestions as to what could have
been done, should still be done, and what should be avoided in the future for other countries
on the edge of transition from communism (for instance, Cuba, a significant object of an
American interest due to geographical location). For countries transitioning to democracy, this
study will address what kind of legal measures and financial actions should be taken by the
World Bank and the IMF to increase governmental accountability and the accountability of
their respective representative entities with regard to use of international money, loans, grants
and aid.
Chapter II will provide a historic overview of the role and objectives of the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund. Chapter III will highlight recent changes in the overall
policy of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and will review operations,
objectives and goals, with emphasis on the policies toward the Russian Federation. Chapter IV
will link to the comprehensive research and discoveries of the Speaker’s Advisory Group on
Russia, 106th U.S. Congress, Russia's Road to Corruption, a presentation by Representative
Christopher Cox, Chairman, House of Representatives Policy Committee.13 This presentation
is the result of a superior study of the fundamental flaws of the Clinton administration’s policy
toward Russia. Chapter V will look inside the criminal activities with regard to corruption,
fraud, extortion, money laundering, racketeering and related unlawful executions in the
presence of transitioning legislation, legislative process, law drafting, judiciary, law
12 Road to Corruption, supra note 4, Executive Summary.
13 Road to Corruption, supra note 4.
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enforcement and overall legal enforcement in Russia during its transition from communism
toward democracy. Chapter VI will uncover the role of the World Bank and the IMF in
funding corruption in Russia, while intending to provide money for the economic reforms.
In conclusion, Chapter VII suggests that not only should Russia be held accountable for the
globally spread corruption of its banking system and the system at whole, but also the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the U.S. should be held accountable for
the lack of stewardship and resulting damage, and should improve their ongoing work for
better transparency, accountability and conditionality of the loans. Several suggestions to
improve the situation, to strengthen legal enforcement and promote the rule of law in the
global environment and the Russian Federation will be made, including a proposition for
repatriation of embezzled funds from violators.
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CHAPTER 2
HISTORY, NATURE, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND AND THE WORLD BANK
The International Monetary Fund and World Bank were both chartered as a result of the
international negotiations of 45 governments at a conference conducted on July 1-22, 1944 in
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, U.S.A. The goal of the participating countries and founders
was to establish a framework for economic cooperation and development that would lead to a
more stable and prosperous global economy after the Great Depression and World War II.
This charter marks a turning point and a landmark in the changing: world economy, history
and global relations.14 The American scholar Harry Dexter White, who allegedly was a Soviet
spy,15 and the British economist John Maynard Keynes16, two brilliant economists of the early
twentieth century, were credited with the idea of a voluntary international financial forum
such as the International Monetary Fund.
The year 1945 is highlighted in the history of the world, not only as a year of a victory
against Nazi Germany, but also as a year when 29 countries explicitly signed the Articles of
14 For a comprehensive analysis of the history of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), see
MARGARET GARRISTEN DE VRIES, THE IMF IN A CHANGING WORLD, 1945-85 (1986).
15 Arnold Beichman, Guilty as Charged, HOOVER DIGEST, 1999, available at
http://www.hooverdigest.org/992/beichman.html (reprinted with permission of the Weekly
Standard, which first published the article on Dec. 14, 1998).
16ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: 1883-1946: ECONOMIST, PHILOSOPHER,
STATESMAN (2005).
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Agreement.17 of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development known as the World Bank. Also in 1945, the United Nations
came into existence as well.
The International Monetary Fund initially consisted of about 40 members. Different
sources indicate different numbers primarily because some of the members at the beginning
stage were unable initially to meet the requirements established and/or didn't sign the Articles
of Agreement by the set date of December 31, 1945.18 As of 2005 the membership reached
184 worldwide.19
The IMF is a special financial forum the main purpose of which is to openly discuss the
fiscal policies of its members and to avoid severe exchange restrictions on international
currencies. IMF membership is open to any government which conducts foreign policy
accordingly and accepts the Articles of Agreement and by-laws under which the IMF is run.20
Each participating government is also required to contribute funds to the operation of the
organization. Most funds are put into a special account upon which the organization draws if a
member-country needs emergency loans to stabilize its economy. Although voting procedures
in place at the IMF are weighted in favor of the largest financial contributors, members reach
a consensus before loaning money. Recipient governments are encouraged to restructure their
economies to promote free trade, but are under little obligation to follow the measures dictated
17 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa08.htm [hereinafter Articles].
18Id. art. 2, para. 1.
19 A FACTSHEET: THE IMF AT A GLANCE, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2005),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
20 See id.
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by the Fund, which is one of the main reasons leading to the recent failures and heavy
criticism of the institution.
In the early stages of its existence the International Monetary Fund was dominated by the
United States, which had one-third of the voting power.21
Article I of the Articles of Agreement sets out the International Monetary Fund’s
main responsibilities22:
promoting international monetary cooperation;
facilitating the expansion and balanced growth of global trade;
promoting currency exchange stability;
assisting in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments; and
making its resources available (under adequate safeguards) to members
experiencing difficulties in repayments.
While the International Monetary Fund promotes international monetary cooperation and
provides policy advice and technical assistance with the sole purpose of helping countries
build and maintain strong economies, the Fund also makes loans and helps countries devise
policy programs to solve balance of payments problems. IMF loans are relatively short-term
loans, and funded mainly by the pool of quota contributions provided by its members. This
environment is where sufficient financing on affordable terms should be obtained to meet net
international payments.
21 Rodrigo de Rato, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, Address at the Circulo de
Economía: Globalization and the New Priorities of the IMF (Oct. 20, 2005),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2005/102005a.htm [hereinafter Globalization Address].
14
To the contrary, the World Bank promotes long-term economic development and poverty
reduction by providing technical, financial and organizational support to help countries to
reform particular sectors or implement specific projects—for example, building schools and
health centers, working on gender issues, urban development, providing water and electricity,
fighting disease, protecting the environment, and solving urging problems of cultural
improvement and poverty reduction. World Bank assistance is generally long-term, and is
funded both by member country contributions and through bond issuance.23
In the 60 years of its operations, the IMF has maintained a mainly steady course, while the
World Bank has done quite the opposite. When Europe recovered after World War II, the
World Bank turned its attention to Latin America and Africa, and later to the Eastern post-
Soviet Bloc. With its overriding mission to eliminate poverty worldwide, the World Bank
became extensively and heavily involved in a countless number of different projects in
countries all over the world.
Two entities, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the
International Development Association (IDA), together constitute the World Bank as an
International Organization. With other three institutions, the International Finance
Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), all five form the World
Bank Group (WBG).24
22 Articles, supra note 17, art. 1.
23 For a comprehensive overview of the objectives and structure of World Bank Group and
World Bank, see PAUL MCCLUER, A GUIDE TO THE WORLD BANK (2003).
24 Id.
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The main objective of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
is lending to the governments of middle-income, as well as creditworthy low-income
countries. The International Development Association (IDA) provides interest-free loans,
which are still called credits, to the governments of the poorest countries in the world. The
International Finance Corporation (IFC) lends directly to the private sector of developing
countries. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provides guarantees to
investors in developing countries against losses caused by non-commercial risk. The
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) serves as an arbitrating
institution for international investment disputes.25
It is recognizable that the initial purpose for establishing the IMF and the World Bank was
economic stabilization and growth in the post-World War II era, rather than any other related
issues that may appear relevant today. The issues of legal constraints, conditions of loaning
money, monitoring and control of fulfillment financed programs, and accountability by the
particular government-borrower were taken into consideration but not emphasized enough by
the IMF and the World Bank in previous years, indeed not until the new millennium.26
Thus, for example, there was and is a principle of conditionality of funds in both
institutions. When a country borrows from the IMF or the World Bank, its government makes
commitments on economic and financial policies—a requirement known as conditionality.27
25 WORLD BANK PUBLICATIONS, WORLD BANK GROUP ORGANIZATIONAL DIRECTORY (1993).
26 THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS
MOVEMENTS (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., (1998).
27 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND REVIEW DEPARTMENT,
CONDITIONALITY IN FUND-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS, OVERVIEW (2001),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/overview/index.htm [hereinafter
CONDITIONALITY REPORT].
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Conditionality is a way for the IMF and the World Bank to monitor that their loans are being
used effectively in resolving the borrower's economic or other difficulties, so that the country
will be able to repay promptly and funds can be made available to other members in need. In
previous years the IMF and the World Bank didn't emphasize this important aspect of loaning
money well enough or did not strongly comply with personally established guidelines. The
situation had drastically changed when the World Bank and the IMF became heavily involved
with post-Soviet Russia in the early 90s. Relations with the Russian Federation failed the
trustworthiness test. Those relationships became one of the most significant examples of the
flaws in the policies and procedures within the World Bank and the IMF due to the role, size,
military power and historical importance of Russia either as an ally of the United States of
America in missile disarmament, oil cooperation and the recently launched war on terrorism,
or as an enemy during the Cold War with the U.S., the largest contributor to the World Bank
and IMF.28
Although in recent years, the IMF and the World Bank obviously have worked very hard to
admit the importance and focus and streamline the principle of conditionality,29 in order to
adjust their policies and continue promoting national ownership of strong and effective
policies in the member-countries, the principle of conditionality must remain an extremely
high priority.
In 1999 and 2000 the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund caused a lot of
controversy and were openly and heavily criticized.30 Activities of both institutions drew large
28 Road to Corruption, supra note 4, Executive Summary.
29 CONDITIONALITY REPORT, supra note 27.
30 SEBASTIAN MALLABY, THE WORLD’S BANKER: A STORY OF FAILED STATES, FINANCIAL
CRISES, AND THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS, 480 (2004).
17
crowds of demonstrators protesting the role the organizations play on the global stage.
Activists accused both the World Bank and the IMF of encouraging poverty instead of fighting
it, shifting good jobs away from industrialized nations, causing danger to wildlife and dictating
austere economic policies to world governments.31 A lot of projects financed by the World
Bank appeared to be less than successful and often harmful instead.32 The IMF on its part
wasted huge amounts of money. Often money loaned by the IMF to support currencies was
diverted to support political parties and or laundered (Russia, Argentina).33 Quite often no
strict measures were taken to restructure failing economies, and loans were never repaid.
The World Bank and the IMF took all public criticism in a recent decade very seriously,
and began working on restructuring and adjusting to new demands, meeting globalization
challenges with constantly improving performances, thus proving the significance, flexibility
and overall importance of their work internationally. Despite difficulties, both organizations
are globally expanding and all member governments continue to support the IMF and the
World Bank as evidenced by their continued contributions.34
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
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CHAPTER 3
THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND –
CHANGING POLICIES FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM
3.1. Overview of the Most Important Changes in General Policies for the New
Millennium. Conditionality, Transparency and Accountability
Following heavy criticism, the World Bank and the IMF worked intensively to adapt their
policies to new demands. In the past few years the World Bank and the IMF have implemented a
number of steps in order to right the wrongs of these two multilateral institutions and make their
work and policies and procedures more transparent. With transparency the accountability of both
multilateral institutions and borrowing countries might be significantly improved to avoid a
misuse of international monetary funds in the future.
The World Bank in June of 2002 implemented “The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of
Information”35 to replace an outdated policy published in March 1994.36 Historical information is
publicly made available a year after its issuance.
The Policy stated that the vast majority of information must be publicly available including
Articles of Agreement, By-laws of the Bank, the Bank's agreements with the United Nations and
with a number of United Nations entities; Guarantee, and Development Credit Agreements, and
35 THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK POLICY ON DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION (2002)
[hereinafter POLICY ON DISCLOSURE], available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTARCHIVES/Resources/DisclosurePolicy.pdf (last visited
Nov. 27, 2005).
36 Id. at 1.
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Draft Agreements prepared for negotiations. Agreements between other parties in relation to
Bank-financed projects are also publicly available.37
[F]ramework Agreements between the Bank and donors and Administration
Agreements between the Bank and donors relating to trust funds, as well as
agreements providing for such funds between the Bank and the recipient of
such funds, are all publicly available after they have been signed on behalf of
the parties to the particular agreement and have entered into effect, and after the
parties to such agreements have given their consent to such proposed
disclosure.38
All money tranches must be presented in the form of a Tranche Release Document (TRD),
which will reflect the status of the program being supported under particular operation.39
Another substantial achievement of the World Bank was approved on April 13, 2004 by the
World Bank's Executive Directors, a new policy framework governing the expenditures that the
Bank may or may not finance in investment lending. New Operational Policy and Bank
Procedures statements, OP/BP 6.00, “Bank Financing”, have been issued, and the Operational
Manual revised.
[T]he new policy rests on three guiding principles: (a) that expenditures financed
by the Bank need to be productive; (b) that the impact the operations financed
have on the country's fiscal sustainability needs to be acceptable; and (c) that
acceptable oversight arrangements, including fiduciary oversight arrangements,
need to be in place to ensure that loan proceeds are used only for the purposes
intended, with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency.40
37 Id. at 19.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 8.
40 WORLD BANK, ELIGIBILITY OF EXPENDITURES IN WORLD BANK LENDING: A NEW POLICY
FRAMEWORK,
http://www1.worldbank.org/operations/eligibility/documents/March26ExpenditureEligibilityBoa
rdPaper.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
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The IMF on its side launched the specially designed “Standards and codes initiative.”41
[I]t was a prominent component of the efforts to strengthen the international
financial architecture that were initiated in response to the emerging market
crises of the 1990s. Noting the need to strengthen financial systems by such
means as the adoption of best international standards, in its Communiqué of
April 16, 1998, the Interim Committee called on the Fund to work with other
concerned institutions and organizations responsible for the development of
standards and to consider how best the Fund could assist in the dissemination of
such standards to the membership and encourage members to adopt them.42
According to its own Department of the Policy Development and Review evaluation as of
2005, it is still questionable how well standards set by the IMF are met six years after adoption.43
Although the principle of conditionality in the IMF has existed since the late 80s, its
importance rose significantly in the 1990s and emerged in 2000 through evaluation of the results
of IMF lending to transitioning post-Soviet countries and other countries with non-market
mechanisms.44 The recognized principle of conditionality transitioned into the principle of
Structural Conditionality (SC) with a more developed approach to meet the demands of the new
era and the challenges of the new millennium and the tasks set by the United Nations for global
poverty reduction. It also recognizes as fact, though indirectly, the increased, globally spread
corruption brought on by the emerging countries, not excluding the Russian Federation.
41 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1998),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/cm/1998/041698a.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
42 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND REVIEW DEPARTMENT, THE
STANDARDS AND CODES INITIATIVE—IS IT EFFECTIVE? AND HOW CAN IT BE IMPROVED?:
BACKGROUND PAPER (2005), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/070105b.htm (last
visited Nov. 27, 2005).
43 Id. at 33.
44 INT ERNA TION AL MON ETARY FUN D , EVA LUAT ION OF STRUC TURA L CONDI TIONAL ITY IN
IMF-SUP PO RTED PRO GR AM S: ISSUES PAPER FOR AN EVALUATION BY THE INDEPENDENT
EVALUATION OFFICE (IEO) (2005) [hereinafter IMF SC EVALUATION],
http://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2005/sc/051805.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
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[T]he use of structural conditions also became important as the IMF increasingly
recognized the importance of structural reforms for achieving more sustainable
results in the areas of macroeconomic stability and better equipping economies
to cope with the effects of adverse external shocks. As a result, policies such as
trade reform, price liberalization and privatization became important areas of
SC in programs aimed at increasing efficiency and promoting investment and
growth. Strengthening the independence of central banks, reducing contingent
liabilities emanating from decentralized agencies and state-owned enterprises,
and strengthening the regulatory framework of the financial sector are examples
of SC geared towards reducing domestic and external financial vulnerabilities.45
Those vulnerabilities, left unnamed in the IMF Evaluation of 2005, certainly include flaws
in the financial and banking systems and in other features of a free market economy, including
laws and regulations in Russia in 1991-2000, widespread corruption, and the extremely
dangerous accumulation of debt via the IMF and other lenders.46
[9.] Protect the Russian people from further governmental abuse of IMF
lending.
The Russian government's dangerous accumulation of debt via the
International Monetary Fund and other international lenders, and the
misapplication of that money through corruption within and without the
Russian government, contributed to the total collapse of Russia's economy in
1998. It has also created a heavy burden of debt. The Advisory Group notes that
for these reasons many reform-minded Russian officials have strongly
advocated an end to further borrowing from the IMF.
The Advisory Group recommends that the United States condition any
further support in the IMF of new Russian sovereign borrowing, and through its
participation in the IMF Board of Governors work to condition any such
lending to Russia (whether for refinancing of existing Russian debt or the
extension of any new credit), on the enactment of legal reforms needed to
establish a free enterprise economy in Russia, and to stem capital flight and
money laundering. Among the other conditions that should be sought are an end
to Russian barriers to international trade and cooperation with U.S. and other
law enforcement authorities in combating money laundering.
The author of this study is a proud member of the large group of reform-minded citizens of
Russia, though not mentioned in the Recommendations chapters of the Speaker’s Advisory
45 Id. at 1.
46 Road to Corruption, supra note 4, at Recommendations.
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Group on Russia presentation47 by officials who appealed in July 1999 at the financial session of
Prime Week at the World Bank to IMF and World Bank officials to cut the pipeline of money to
Russia, and to take measures to decrease the burden of external debt, which is unbearable by the
ordinary Russian population, as described in subchapter 1.1. of this thesis.
Around the same time in 2000, when the House of Representatives of the 106th United
States Congress became familiar with the discoveries and recommendations of the Speaker's
Advisory Group on Russia, the IMF's Managing Director launched the streamlining of the
conditionality principle which became the Structural Conditionality (SC) principle.
[L]argely in response to this criticism, in 2000 the Managing Director issued an
interim guidance note aimed at streamlining SC in IMF-supported programs.
This was followed by the issuance in 2002 of new conditionality guidelines,
which stress the need for parsimony and include a test of “criticality” for any
variable selected for conditionality. To be included in a program, conditions must
be “critical” for the achievement of that program’s objectives. The guidelines
also stress the need to seek national ownership of programs. 48
In addition to The Standards and Codes initiative, The Structural Conditionality Guidelines
and The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information policy, an external audit has been
implemented to audit accounts with the World Bank and the IMF.
Part of the audit process consists of statements covering the project’s final reporting period
and is normally completed after the closing date of the loan. The importance of the final audit is
of such significance that the Bank sometimes will finance the costs for final audits under loans
through an escrow account. If these circumstances exist, the borrower or project entity concludes
a contract for the audit prior to closing date. The contract is a lump sum or a fixed price contract,
and requires completion of the audit within six months after the end of the fiscal year of the final
47 Road to Corruption, supra note 4.
48 IMF SC EVALUATION, supra note 44, at 2.
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disbursement made under the loan. The borrower or project entity opens an escrow account on
the terms and conditions that are acceptable to the bank into which the agreed lump sum is
deposited by the Bank prior to the closing date or during the four-month extended period for the
receipt of the withdrawal applications.
It is important to note that if the Bank does not receive an acceptable audit report by the due
date, the borrower will be requested to repay the amount advanced into the escrow account for
the audit to the Bank.49 More important is the fact that despite the external audit requirement
there is no sufficient mechanism offered so far for repatriation of embezzled funds of the loans
servicing specific programs from the receiving members’ countries. Only a mechanism for
returning money for audit has been developed by the Bank so far.
Another challenge for the World Bank and the IMF in the last decade of the twentieth
century on the verge of a new Millennium was to discover, admit and later adopt an entirely new
philosophy of relations with emerging economies. Although the World Bank and the IMF have
had some experience with financing legal reforms and judiciary reforms, for instance in the U.S.
in 1970-1990, it had never before done so for emerging post-Soviet countries. Therefore at an
early stage, in the beginning of the 90s, the World Bank and the IMF initially used the same
approach and techniques as before without adjusting to the new demands. Only by the end of the
1990s after a number of significant failures of different projects, the World Bank and the IMF
began paying more attention to substantial differences in philosophy of financing and their
policy implementation in emerging market economies.
49 WORLD BANK, OPERATIONAL MANUAL.
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Thus, the development of a massive internal market in private capital has transformed the
World Bank’s and IMF’s relationship with both advanced economies and emerging markets in
the period surrounding the early 90s. The United Kingdom and Italy borrowed from the IMF in
1976-1977, the last time that an industrial country sought financial support. With fewer industrial
countries needing to borrow money, it freed up some funds that could be allocated for
developing or emerging countries.
The emergence of large international capital flows has transformed the IMF and the World
Bank relationship with emerging markets. This first began in the 1980s debt crisis, when much
of Latin America was affected by reckless borrowing and unwise lending. Turbulence in
international capital markets hit Mexico, the major Asian economies; Russia, Turkey, Brazil, and
Argentina in the 1990s, and the IMF came to their rescue. The first events happened in
conjunction with others, and more recently they were single-country events.50 .
It was widely thought that America held all the cards when it came to controlling the World
Bank and the IMF. That is not true, however, because the United States only has about 17% of
the total voting power while the IMF’s shareholders are 184 member countries. Most IMF
decisions reflect a consensus as opposed to a formal vote of the IMF’s Executive Board, which is
the body that makes the institution’s day-to-day decisions. While legally most decisions require
only a simple majority of 51%, in practice, almost all the decisions in the IMF get broad support,
indicating that if a vote were held, the majority would be much higher.
Some of the most important decisions, such as increasing the size of the IMF’s resources or
determining changes on borrowings from the Fund, require a 70% or 85% majority. Clearly it is
possible for the United States and/or a coalition of industrial countries to veto such decisions. A
50 Globalization Address, supra note 21.
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block of developing countries could also veto decisions because they represent approximately
37% of the voting power in the Executive Board.51
Rodrigo de Rato, present Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, said that
the IMF needs to deepen its work on low-income countries.52 Those countries need
macroeconomic policy advice from the Fund and they often need financial support from the
Fund. The IMF for its part is trying to be fair in its lending as well as voting by seeking
consensus.
Over the past sixty years the IMF has grown from a small fund servicing the purpose of free
trade and currency free exchange flow to one that is nearly global in size as well as in objectives.
It has strong backers and supports countries throughout the world. So does the World Bank.
Mr. De Rato highlighted in his speech on October 20, 2005 in Barcelona, Spain that the
history of IMF is a great one and it will only improve. With the improvement, however, the IMF
must learn to adapt, as well as evolve with the changing financial world.
“Like a great city it [IMF] has grown and changed, and matured. My goal is to persuade the
members of the institution that we need to manage the process of change, not resist it, and to
make the institution ready for the challenges of the next five to ten years, while preserving the
strength and flexibility that will allow my successors to manage the Fund’s adaptation over the
next 50 years.”53
3.2. History and Dynamics of Relations with the Soviet Union and Russia
The Soviet Union applied for membership in the IMF and four organizations of the World
Bank Group; the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International
51 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, A FACTSHEET: IMF QUOTAS,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
52 Globalization Address, supra note 21.
53 Id.
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Finance Corporation, the International Development Association, and the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency in July of 1991.
A month later, in August, the World Bank’s executive directors approved the creation of a
special $50 million trust fund for technical cooperation in providing technical support for
economic reforms in the former Soviet Union.
In November of that same year, the World Bank President Lewis T. Preston paid an official
visit to the former Soviet Union and newly independent Russia, and the sides signed an
agreement on technical cooperation between the Bank and the Soviet government. Russia was
one of the four ex-Soviet republics that agreed to participate in the work of the Bank.
In the fall of 1991 the World Bank opened its temporary office in Moscow. On January 7,
1992 the Russian Federation Government applied for membership in the IMF and the World
Bank Group. Russia joined these organizations in June of 1992.
The Bank opened a permanent office in Moscow in early 1993. It currently employs about
70 people, mainly Russian citizens. Showing signs of permanency in the country allowed trust in
the Bank to grow. With the Soviet Union in the past, Russia was still growing into what it would
become. The presence of the World Bank in the Russian Federation was a positive step for the
Bank as well as citizens of Russia. However, it was very controversial.
In June of the same year, 1993, the Bank organized a multilateral meeting in Paris to discuss
priority reforms in Russia as well as to coordinate external aid related to them.
The World Bank President Lewis T. Preston at that time paid a three-day visit to the Russian
Federation. The focus of the visit was on the energy, financial, social, and agricultural sectors of
the Russian economy in addition on Bank’s possible assistance in the country’s transition to a
market economy “While the benefits of rapid economic growth are visible in Russia, economic
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growth has been uneven, and poor regions and segments of the population have fallen further
behind. Almost 20% of Russia's population lives below the poverty line.”54
James D. Wolfensohn, was the President of the World Bank from January 1, 1995 until May
31, 2005. In October of 1995 he made his first visit to Russia and made official visits to the
country every year thereafter. 55
The IMF and the World Bank, using their knowledge, expertise and discretion, were and
still are trying their best to help Russia in transition toward a free market economy and an open
society, as well as to get Russia out of poverty. While trying to do what was best for the country,
the World Bank and the IMF became involuntary accomplices to Russian money laundering, the
development of corruption and the blossoming of organized crime. It is imperative to
acknowledge that while some international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World
Bank are trying to do their best for the country and the global community, the community must
be leery of fraud, corruption, money laundering and misuse of international loans and grants.
Today, on the edge of 2006 and after nearly 15 years of perestroika and glasnost, Russia is
still in deep indebtness despite of abundant natural resources and sharply increased prices for
crude oil and gas, which are very favorable for the Russian economy.56 Russia is now a dying
country as population size is permanently declining (total deaths by all causes from 1216 per
54 THE WORLD BANK, RUSSIAN FEDERATION: TEN THINGS YOU NEVER KNEW ABOUT THE WORLD
BANK IN RUSSIA,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/RUSSIANFEDERAT
IONEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20251181~menuPK:517710~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSit
ePK:305600,00.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
55 Globalization Address, supra note 21.
56 See OIL ALLOCATIONS REPORT, supra note 1.
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every 100,000 citizens in 1992 increased to 1598 deaths per every 100,000 in 2004)57, but the
poverty level remains the same (average income per capita is lower then US$90 per month).58
Russia is still recognized by the global community as an emerging market economy.59 It is
closing the doors to transparency, a free and independent press, journalism and mass-media.60
Russia is now changing democratic laws previously permitting election of local officials and
Governors of Regions by direct vote of the local electorate toward appointment by the
President61 (could you even imagine for a minute that the Governor of Georgia, Florida, New
Jersey or any other state would be appointed by the President of the United States?). Today,
Russia is undoing privatization of some of the most key formerly privately owned companies,
Yukos for example, and turning these companies into state-owned enterprises.62
Very legitimate questions are arising: are the reforms working? Is the money loaned to
Russia by the World Bank and the IMF serving the intended purposes?
57 FEDERAL STATE STATISTIC SERVICE, DEATH RATES BY MAIN CLASSES OF CAUSES OF DEATH,
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b05_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/05-07.htm (last visited Nov. 27,
2005).
58 FEDERAL STATE STATISTIC SERVICE, SUBSISTENCE MINIMUM LEVEL,
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b05_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/07-13.htm (last visited Nov. 27,
2005).
59 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, RUSSIAN FEDERATION: SELECTED ISSUES (2005), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05379.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
60 Joscelyn Jurich, Evolution of Russia, Ex-Communist Media Examined, OVERSEAS PRESS CLUB
OF AMERICA, available at
http://www.opcofamerica.org/press_freedom/articles/110705_russiaevolution.php (last visited
Nov. 27, 2005).
61 Nikolay Petrov, Putin's Reforms Are Dangerous for Russia, THE MOSCOW TIMES, Sept. 15,
2004, available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/09/15/006.html.
62 See generally Yukos Minority Shareholder Coalition,
http://www.yukosshareholdercoalition.com.
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3.3. Overview of the Role of The World Bank and The IMF in Legal Reform in Russia
in 1992-2000
Whatever project the World Bank now undertakes, whether with the aim of economic
development, environmental protection or health, one way or another some elements of legal
reform will be present. It may be in the form of collaborating with the legislative branch of the
country to whom the loan is issued, to amend the laws or to improve them or to draft entirely
new legislation with the precise purpose of better achieving goals of the financed project.
Moreover, both international financial institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, are now
themselves the objects of general or legislative reforms to meet the rapidly changing
requirements of today’s rapidly changing world trends.
Legal and judicial reform may include, but are not limited to: amending a country's laws to
improve the business environment and improve the investment climate, harmonizing laws for
internal consistency, adapting law to contemporary conditions, or solving the problem of finding
means of legal enforcement of existing as well as new laws and regulations. It is imperative for
any country’s economic growth to have an effective legal system which promotes development
by protecting persons’ rights and their property, allowing peaceful and civilized (as opposed to
racketeering, extortion, corruption, money laundering and violent) resolution of disputes,
facilitating economic exchange, and letting citizens hold their government accountable.63
Since the role of the IMF is to provide short-term and very specialized financial assistance
to fix monetary, budgetary and currency exchange problems in the borrower-country, the IMF
didn't emphasize any legal reform issues with Russia, or momentarily scrutinize the existing
63 For more information, see generally THE WORLD BANK GROUP, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE
MARKET ECONOMY, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/index.cfm.
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legal environment since Russia joined the IMF in 1992. Obviously that was a very shortsighted
policy. In such unique circumstances as Russia faced after the collapse of communism, it was
very reckless of anyone to rely on the country's existing laws. Here the World Bank stepped in,
although the initiative itself did not come from the World Bank. From the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991 until 1996, the World Bank was not involved in financing any legal projects or
reforms in Russia. The Russian legal reform project by the World Bank began in 1996 following
a request from the Russian Government.64
This clearly indicates that the IMF and the World Bank, while financing numerous projects
to one of the most powerful countries in transition in the world, did not pay much-needed
attention to reform of the legal climate in Russia. The analogy is to allowing powerful, speedy
cars and big trucks on the streets of New York City with all the traffic lights off, no stop signs or
other traffic signs, and in addition allowing traffic in both directions on all the streets and
avenues. The same dangerous lack of internal regulations existed in the link among the World
Bank, the IMF and Russia. Huge amounts of money had been allocated to the country where
there was no economically and commercially workable civil legal system, or the existing legal
system never in its history served the ideology and purposes of an open market society.
While facing this new dilemma, it must be recognized that for about two decades the World
Bank was working on different legal projects in many countries.65 Some of them failed, some
64 For a detailed analysis of the legal reform project financed by the World Bank in Russia, see
Monika Borbely et al., Project Report on the Role of Foreign Aid for Legal Reform Programs in
the Russian Federation, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton
University (Jan.1999), available at
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/projectreport.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2005)
[hereinafter Princeton Project Report].
65 See id. at 58.
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had reasonable support. However, the legal project in Russia appeared to be one of the largest
(the Bank committed US$58 million), as well as one of the most unusual and difficult for
international donors.66
Acknowledging the importance of sound judicial systems to good governance and economic
growth all over the world, the World Bank and several other donor organizations have funded
judicial reform projects in more than two dozen developing countries and transition economies
during the last two decades. Yet little is still known about the actual effect of judicial reform on
economic performance or even about what elements constitute a sound reform project.67
Thus extensive experience and the less-than-successful results of judicial reform initiatives
in such countries as Bangladesh, India, and Argentina68 should have served as warning signs to
the World Bank to provide more reasonable safeguards for itself in its activities with the Russian
Federation in 1996.
Indeed, there are numerous points on which the World Bank should be heavily criticized in
regard to the legal reforms in Russia. However, the scale of the reforms and initiatives launched
by the World Bank in Russia as the unique field of their implementation is enormous.
The main objectives of the project launched in Russia by the World Bank in 1996 include:
improving the quality of drafting of economic laws; improving the classification and codification
of legislation to increase access to legal information; improving legal education through new
66 Id. at 59.
67 Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues, 14
WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 117-36 (1999), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/research/journals/wbro/obsfeb99/pdf/article6.pdf. (last visited Nov.
14, 2005)
68 Richard E. Messick, International Support for Civil Justice Reform in Developing and
Transition Countries: An Overview and Evaluation (2000), available at
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/donorsupported.doc (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
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books, teaching materials, and teacher training, especially in economic law fields; and training of
judges in the courts of general jurisdiction and arbitrage courts.69
Indeed, a huge number of other closely related issues were left out, not ignored but
underestimated. One example is legal empowerment or legal enforcement. Legal education and
training of lawyers and judges would not work without powerful, widespread education of the
population, mass media coverage, community workshops, and enhancement of police and other
law enforcement. Without effective mechanisms of legal enforcement covering all aspects of
legal and judicial reforms, etc., each and every good governing law will become worthless. On
the other hand Russian cultural and historical ignorance toward the rule of law was obvious and
hard not to acknowledge at the beginning of the 90s, as there was no law under the Soviet Union
in its civilized meaning as it exists in an open market society.
To implement its legal reform project in Russia, the World Bank decided to act via a
specially created non-governmental organization, the Russian Foundation for Legal Reform
(RFLR).70 This non-governmental organization RFLR was founded in Russia in April 1996 in
accordance with the President of the Russian Federation’s Decree No.81 of 22.02.1996. The
founders were the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of
Finance, the Ministry of Justice, the Federal Commission on Securities and the Stock Market of
the Russian Federation Federal Government, and the Russian Academy of Science.71 The initial
69 Princeton Project Report, supra note 64, at 20.
70 Id.
71 FAR EAST CENTER OF ECONOMIC EDUCATION, RUSSIAN FOUNDATION FOR LEGAL REFORM,
http://www.fecee.vladivostok.ru/FECEE/rflr.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2005).
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existence of this organization was solely based on the loan from the World Bank requested by
the Russian government, which, indeed was expected to be repaid, and had changed over time.72
The World Bank itself believed that the Russian government had the full intention of
repaying the loan, and thought that by borrowing versus receiving money in the form of a grant
or aid, the government would be more interested in participating fully to achieve the designated
goals of legal and judiciary reforms.
A summary of the World Bank legal reform project in Russia is presented in Table 1.73
Indeed, the legal reform project in Russia became a challenge for the World Bank: the size
of the country, political instability and uncertainties accompanying the transitioning economy,
the rush for any countable results to prove the success of reforms due to the political issue of
President Boris Yeltsin’s coming re-election campaign in 1996,74 all might be seen as flaws in
the World Bank’s policy implementation.
Not surprisingly, only 20% of all money directed toward legal reform in Russia from the
World Bank was disbursed and utilized between launching the project in 1996 and reporting in
1999.75 The graphic description of disbursement is presented in Figure 1.
It was expected that the remaining 80% of funding must be disbursed by the end of the four-
year project.
It has been noted that by acting through RFLR, a Russian-created and Russian-based
organization, the World Bank achieved a goal of direct representation of the interests of Russian
72 Princeton Project Report, supra note 64, at 62.
73 Id. at 60. See infra Table 1.
74 Id. at 66-67.
75 Id. at 20, 68-69. See infra Figure 1.
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citizens and the Russian government in moving forward legal reform in Russia.76 However, the
direct link of RFLR to the Russian government on the other hand increased the influence of the
World Bank on the Russian government via legal means. In this case, if the Russian government
did misuse and misplace part of the international aid and loan from the World Bank, it is
certainly as much the fault of the World Bank as of the Russian Government. And it should be a
duty of the World Bank, as well as an urgent agenda priority, to develop mechanisms for
repatriation of embezzled funds, perhaps through improvement in the World Bank’s by-laws and
internal regulations.
76 Id. at 71-72.
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Table 1: Summary of the World Bank Project Description in Russia, May 1996.
Project
Name
Description Budget
(US$ million)
Legilsative
Drafting
 Improve the quality of drafting of economic laws,
decrees and regulations;
 Assist the Government of Russia in analyzing
federal/regional and federal interagency coordination in
drafting laws and regulations;
 On a pilot basis, to improve legislative drafting at the
regional level.
20.0
Legal
Information
 Designing the appropriate classification of legislation
and identifying the appropriate method of codifying Russian
legislation;
 Determining the appropriate scope and framework, as
well as levels of public investment in the systems for collection,
organization and dissemination of legal information.
24.8
Legal
Education
 Introduce innovative teaching methods and materials,
increase exchange between legal academia and practice and
improve teacher training;
 Improve public awareness and understanding of the role
of law in a market economy.
20.0
Judicial
Reform
 Improve the quality of judicial training;
 Assist in analyzing impediments of effective court
administration and case management;
 Assist the development of consensus for necessary
structural reform;
 Promote the development of Alternative Dispute
resolution (ADR)
10.4
Other  Other priority activities, agreed upon between the
Borrower and the World Bank
3.0
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Fig. 1. Disbursement of International Funds from the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund to the Russian Federation in 1996-1999.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE LINK OF THE WORLD BANK, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND RUSSIA
The United States of America since the date of creation of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank in 1945 was and still is the most powerful contributor to their
monetary funding. It was previously mentioned that the U.S. has had one-third of the voting
power. Today the U.S. holds 17 percent of the voting power. Based on the charters77 of those
international financial institutions, the largest donor has the most voting power. Although,
decisions are made based on a consensus of all members, the largest contributor to a certain
extent is capable of influencing the final decision of the Board of Directors of the IMF or the
Executive Board of the World Bank. This influence may lead to the decisions and actions
performed by the World Bank and the IMF, which later would be recognized not only by the
specific country, but also by the international community and even by the institutions themselves
as flaws or even failures in policies, laws and economic achievements.
Thus, in 2000, when Russia was on its way to electing a new president, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the 106th U.S. Congress launched a wide and deep investigation to
assess the results of the U.S. policy toward Russia during the Yeltsin years. The result of this
effort produced the most comprehensive, honest and detailed report on the U.S. policy flaws with
regard to Russia ever. Six committees of the House of Representatives became involved in this
investigation and assessment.78
77 Articles, supra note 17.
78 Road to Corruption, supra note 4.
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“The Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia comprises the Chairmen of the Committees on
Armed Services, Appropriations, Banking, Intelligence, and International Relations, as well as
the House Vice Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, and additional members of the
House leadership and the committees of jurisdiction.”79
The results of the investigation completed by September 2000 thoroughly describe a huge
number of flaws and failures of the U.S. Administration toward transitioning Russia. They also
reveal what kind of damage had been done through the U.S. policy toward Russia as a trading
partner and influential nuclear counterpart, leading to a world more threatened by Russian
weakness than strength.80
[R]eport begins with a summary of the historic events that led to the collapse of
the Soviet Union in December 1991 and a description of the conditions in
Russia during the last year of the Bush administration and at the
commencement of the Clinton administration. It assesses the task ahead for
Russia in moving from a century of state control to a free enterprise democracy,
and compares that agenda with the actual policies pursued by the Clinton
administration from 1993 to the present. The manifold failures of both Russian
and U.S. government policy are surveyed: the early corruption of the non-
market "privatization" to insiders; the spread of organized crime; the eventual
complete collapse of the Russian economy in 1998; the rise of weapons
proliferation as a means of generating hard currency; and the increasing
estrangement of Russia from the United States, essentially reversing the trends
that existed in 1992.81
The U.S. is, indeed, the largest donor to the IMF and the World Bank. Without its pressure
and in particular that of Vice President Al Gore, the World Bank and the IMF would not be in a
position to give as much money to Russia as they did during the Clinton Administration. The
report revealed that Vice President Al Gore insisted and pressured the World Bank and the IMF
79 Id. at Introduction.
80 Id. at Recommendations.
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to continue issuing loans even as the circumstances made clear that Russia was on the edge of
default. Creation of the Gore-Talbot-Summers troika82 vested authority for the development and
execution of American policy toward Russia in an elite and uniquely insular policy-making
group without accountability to the normal checks and balances within the executive branch.83
In the past decade Russian organized crime’s threat to the world has become universally
acknowledged. A report recently completed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
quotes FBI Director Louis French summarizing the importance of these concerns by “Stat[ing]
bluntly that the ROC (Russian Organized Crime) is the greatest long-term threat to the security
of the United States”. The study concluded that “the impact of ROC on the future stability of
democratic Russia is the key threat for the United States”. A second serious threat is the
transnational activities of ROC in Cyprus, the Caribbean Islands, and other offshore banking
centers the world over.84
Another threat is represented by the corrupt individuals not only in Russia but in the U.S.
Thus, Arthur Christy, former U.S. Attorney, is a key figure in the Bank of New York scandal
being employed by the Russian Incombank as a lawyer who helped the bank in money
laundering schemes.85
The Clinton administration ensured that billions in Western economic assistance to Russia
would amount to more temporizing. The trio’s focus was on micromanagement of the Russian
economy instead of the legal fundamentals that would permit individuals to start their own
81 Id. at Executive Summary.
82 Id. at ch. 4.
83 Id.
84 RUSSIAN LAW INSTITUTE, U.S. LAWYERS HIRED AS SPIN DOCTORS FOR RUSSIAN MOBS,
http://www.russianlaw.org/004.htm and http://www.russianlaw.org/crisis.htm (last visited Nov.
28, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. LAWYERS FOR RUSSIAN MOBS].
85 Id.
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businesses, grow a competitive market, and create a tax base, thus dooming their ‘privatization’
efforts to failure.86
With massive lending and aid to plug the gap in the Russian central government’s operating
budget, the funds were exposed to theft and fraud. The amount of loans from the U.S., the World
Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development added to Russia’s
enormously growing foreign debt, which continued to burden the central government’s operating
budget and weigh down the nation’s economic prospects, as presented in Table 2.87
New policies of the World Bank and the IMF in the new millennium requiring pure
transparency of information allow anyone to locate, not only on paper in highly specialized
publications, but also over the World Wide Web the easily accessed, high-level information, thus
increasing the accountability of the multilateral institutions and sovereign governments. For
instance, it is easy now to find out through widely accessible sources that the most significant
amount of hard currency funds equaling US$4.6 billion was disbursed to the Russian Federation
by the IMF in 1998; as much as US$3,594,250,000 in 1995 and US$2,687,861,200 in 1996
respectively. From 2000 until 2005 no extra loans were issued. However, some restructuring has
been made.88
The overwhelming bulk of the money disbursed as a loan to the Russian Federation was
hidden offshore by the Russian Government, corrupt officials and politicians, mainly in banks on
the Channel Islands (UK territory) and Virgin Islands (U.S. territory), and also in Cyprus
86 Road to Corruption, supra note 4.
87 Id. at. ch. 4, See U.S. Financial Aid to Russia (2000) from IMF Summary of Disbursement and
payments. FY 1999 Annual Report (January 2000). See also infra Table 2.
88 See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, RUSSIAN FEDERATION: TRANSACTIONS WITH THE FUND
FROM MAY 01, 1984 TO OCTOBER 31, 2005, http://www.imf.org/external/country/RUS/index.htm
[hereinafter IMF TRANSACTIONS].
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(Independent) while Russia suffered from the vacuum of appropriate legislature, a weak
judiciary, and corrupted law enforcement.
At the turn of the millennium neither the World Bank nor the IMF was fully exercising its
influence by seeking the support and collaboration of other institutional members to develop and
improve institutional internal rules, by-laws and procedures for lending.
While the American public was entertained by the scandal of President Clinton and Ms.
Monica Lewinsky, the so-called 'Troika' (Gore-Talbot-Summers) was working very hard to
create future explicit dangers for that public by giving birth to the Russian mobster and monster,
corrupted from the very top to the very bottom, from the Government and legislators down into
the streets. In this long ladder so many did not hesitate to sell tons of nuclear materials overseas,
top military and technological secrets and even parts of ballistic missiles, tanks and submarines,
at times just to provide food and minimum necessities for families and children, rather than to
put billions of dollars into offshore banks accounts.
The findings of the Speakers' Advisory Group on Russia are astonishing and deserve to be
reviewed again after the 5th anniversary of the presentation.89 The conclusions clearly reveal the
present and prospective threat to the U.S. security, requiring continuing close and direct attention
from the U.S. President to policy toward Russia. Unfortunately, the present Administration is
again unable to pay adequate attention on the necessary scale to these matters of mutual interest.
President George W. Bush began his first term by becoming immediately preoccupied, in a
manner which has become continuous, with numerous entirely different issues: the war on
terrorism, the war in Iraq, the chain of unfortunate hurricanes, Social Security Reform and Enron
and other corporate scandals which have shaken America. The President's attention is divided
and he does not have the time to allot to Russia’s strife. Once again, the U.S. is missing out on a
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crucial time for relations with Russia. The U.S. is about to lose another golden opportunity to
solidify relations between the U.S. and Russia, especially with the prospective election of a new
president of Russia. The only saving grace is that President George W. Bush and President
Vladimir Putin have somehow a personal sympathy toward each other, perhaps as the biggest
holders of petroleum assets and as members of an oil fraternity, Bush from Texas, Putin from
Russia, rich with oil as well.
Before 2000 70% of Russians held a favorable view of the U.S.; only 37% hold such views
today. More than 80% of Russians polled by the U.S. government in 2000 thought that the U.S.
was seeking to weaken Russia, while a staggering 85% believed that the U.S. sought world
domination. 90
Although the Russians’ view of America has declined, it was still wavering back when
President Clinton was in office. CIA officials had described the information concerning
Chernomyrdin that was provided to Vice President Al Gore as “more detailed and conclusive
than allegations of bribery and insider dealing that have been made in the Russian media and
elsewhere.” Yet, when asked in 2000, whether or not Chernomyrdin is corrupted, Gore replied,
“I have no idea.”91
There was a seriously negative consequence to Russia’s battle against organized crime,
corruption, wrongful privatization, and money laundering, along with the Clinton
administration’s failed economic strategy for Russia and its tight embrace of corrupt officials
including the aforementioned Chernomyrdin, as well as Chubise'.92
89 Road to Corruption, supra note 4.
90 Id. at Executive Summary.
91 Id. at ch. 4.
92 Id.
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Russian Organized Crime (ROC) became responsible not only for grisly mayhem and
violence in all walks of society including politicians (Galina Starovoitova, a former member of
Parliament of very rare reputation, very well respected by the electorate, she become a threat to a
male dominated environment in the Russian governmental hierarchy and was shot to death by a
hit man on November 20, 1998), journalists (Vladislav Listiev, a very well-recognized journalist,
was shot by a hit man on March 3, 1995), but also for ordinary street gangsters who could kill
just for fun or to extort a hundred dollars. ROC also took on functions as diverse as enforcing
contracts and court judgments, providing personal security and channeling bribes from corrupt
officials for scarce resources.93
Because of the failure to focus full attention on replacing Communism from the very
beginning of perestroika with the basic legal elements of the free enterprise system, conditions
allowed organized crime, corruption, violence, and money laundering to flourish. Without the
essentials such as legislated protections for private property, a modern commercial code and
honest, efficient and speedy courts to enforce property rights, the ‘privatization’ of government
entities in Russia predictably resulted in chaos.94
It is understandable that it was practically impossible for America to be able to reach out to
Russia as an ally on all issues, but if legislators, lawyers, the judiciary and the general public
were educated with western values of strong law, the power of legal knowledge would help
significantly to prevent trouble, and it would help the U.S. in the future regardless of who comes
to power after Putin. Putin is not going for an unconstitutional third term, as he stated recently in
October 2005. He will be reelected in 2008. Until 2008 the U.S. must pay extremely serious
93 Vagiph Guseinov, Ot Yeltsina k...? Chronika Tainoi Bor'bi [From Yeltsin to...? The Chronicle
of hidden fight] (1999) (Russ.).
94 Road to Corruption, supra note 4.
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attention to relations with Russia in order not to lose a second time within a decade the golden
chance to turn Russia into an open society once and for all95.
Russia is still in the throes of organized crime, and the recovery has not happened yet:
Top Russian public officials openly acknowledge the problem of the organized crime
takeover of the Russian economy.96
Former Russian Minister of Internal Security Kulikov admitted that he saw no solution to
the problem of mafia control over the Russian banks except the re-nationalization of privately
owned banks. In 1994, Russian Tax Police officer Major Gromov told the Conference of the
Financial Crime Enforcement Network that “almost all Russian banks are corrupt.” Yeltsin
himself called his own country “the biggest mafia state in the world, the super power of crime
that is devastating the state from top to bottom.”97
What sets the Russian mafia apart from others is its unique sophistication and understanding
of the system and its ability to manipulate it via the use of the U.S. power brokers such as
“political” law firms, major accounting firms, commercial and investment banks, political
lobbyists and prominent public relations figures.98
The Clinton administration, by its own admission, said that it gave insufficient attention and
priority to Russian money laundering. The Bank of New York scandal mentioned above, which
involved the laundering of as much as $10 billion total, is a clear example. The Bank of New
York scandal is directly related to Inkombank’s dirty operations. Inkombank was one of Russia’s
top ten banks, and has been the focus of media attention in 1998-2000. It is believed to be linked
95 Id.
96 See U.S. LAWYERS FOR RUSSIAN MOBS, supra note 84.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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to Russian and international organized crime syndicates not only in the United States but in
Australia and a number of other countries also.99
The source goes on to say that the report concluded that “via use of various bookkeeping
machinations” attempts were made to conceal losses amounting to 998.2 billion rubles
(approximately $200 million in US funds), and retained earnings were also inflated by 1.35
rubles ($250 million in US funds). The report concluded that Inkombank was virtually insolvent
largely due to bad loans to ‘questionable entities.’ Read: Russian mafia within the country.100
It is obvious that while the US was trying to help Russia out, in some ways it hurt it as well.
With its well-meaning loans and help, it also aided in the organized crime and external debt of
the Russian nation. The Clinton Administration was somewhat aloof when it came to admitting
how much it knew about how the money was being used. Spokespersons put a spin on it to make
it appear as though there was no threat to the U.S..101
The Bush Administration has been worse, because worse than doing something improperly
is doing nothing. Bush’s attention now lies elsewhere, as he is focused on the war in Iraq, the
hurricanes, and the possibility of his vice president being indicted on a CIA leak.
The Report concluded that U.S. - Russia relations must be the biggest priority of the
President.102 It is imperative that Mr. George W. Bush’s Administration emphasize this aspect of
its external policy and use its power at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) to promote broad financial assistance to Russia, not only in economic and financial issues
but also in much greater measure for strengthening the power of the legal system and legal
enforcement in Russia to build a solid base for a democratic future of its ally in a war on terror.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See Road to Corruption, supra note 4.
102 Id.
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Lending practices that have improved greatly within last few years and the transparency,
conditionality and accountability principles governing the World Bank's and the International
Monetary Fund's (IMF) daily activities could be very well used to achieve the aim and to satisfy
the U.S. as well as global interest in a strong market- and democracy-oriented Russia with a
stable legal system.
It is imperative by all means to help Russian citizens to understand that the U.S. being the
most well-developed democracy on the globe was not seeking to weaken Russia. To the contrary,
the U.S. was capable of recognizing its own flaws and admitting failures in its own policy for
dealing with the corrupted Russian Government and the increasing debt of the Russian nation to
the international community. It was able honestly to assess all the negatives and to make crucial
steps toward correcting wrongdoings not only in U.S. policy but also in its influence on the
policy of the World Bank and the IMF. The legislative branch of the U.S. fulfilled its
commitment, and the irrational lending to Russia was interrupted in 2000. See Table 3.103
Such transparent accountability of the American Government and its legislative branch in
particular is not yet achievable in Russia, while the country is leaning toward strong Presidential
power versus American Federalism with its historically tested system of check and balances.
This chapter will not be concluded properly without mentioning that besides loans from the
World Bank and the IMF, the U.S. and a number of American donors made a significant
contribution to the establishment and development of legal and judicial reforms in Russia. The
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is funded by the U.S. Congress, and it has
been one of the most important donors and supporters of legal reform in Russia.104 However the
majority of its grants and contracts are going directly to American firms and non-government
103 See IMF TRANSACTIONS, supra note 88. See also infra Table 3.
104 Princeton Project Report, supra note 64.
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organizations (NGOs).105 The Agency recognizes that while only 10 years ago the modern legal
system in Russia was virtually non-existent, the framework of the modern judiciary is largely in
place today.106 The list of intermediate U.S. contractors includes:
 ARLI - the American Russian Law Institute Inc., a not-for-profit organization;107
 HID - Harvard Institute for International Development, which itself while using
US$30 million from USAID to consult to Russians on privatization, tax and legal
issues became involved in the corruption scandal related to oil money and is now
being sued by the American Government;108
 ARD/Checchi- Rural Development Institute, an Institute of land law and policy, also
financed by USAID , and who provided Russia policy and legal advice on land
privatization and land market development from 1994 to 1999;109
 ABA/CEELI – American Bar Association/Central and Eastern Europe Law Institute,
which is conducting a number of seminars and clinics not only for lawyers but also
for social advocates all over Russia;110
 Chemonics - Chemonics International Inc. is a partner of USAID, and is globally
recognized for promoting advanced initiatives in different sectors of International
development. The company has its office in Moscow as of 2005, conducts various
105 Id. at 55.
106 See USAID, DATA SHEET (2005), http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/ee/pdf/118-
0221.pdf.
107 See American Russian Law Institute, http://www.russianlaw.org/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
108 See University Diary, http://margaretsoltan.phenominet.com/2004/06/this-heres-big-ol-russki-
oil-platform.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
109 See RURAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, MARKET DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.rdiland.org/CONSULTING/Consulting_topic_Market.html (last visited Nov 28,
2005).
110 See American Bar Association, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/russia/home.html (last
visited Nov. 28, 2005).
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development projects and promotes the rule of law and other free market
initiatives.111
The list of other famous donors includes but is not limited to: the Carnegie Foundation, the
Ford Foundation, Freedom Support Act and the Soros Foundation (Open Society Institute).
111 See USAID, http://www.usaid.ru/en/main/activity/index.shtml?activity_id=644 and
http://www.chemonics.com/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
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Table 2: U.S. Financial Aid to Russia – 1992-1999.
in millions
U.S. Commercial Financing and Insurance
(Export-Import Bank, OPIC, USDA)
$8,890
Non-FREEDOM Support Act Funds' $3,960
International Monetary Fund $3,830
FREEDOM Support Act $2,260
World Bank $1,050
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development $ 306
TOTAL $20,290
Sources: IMF Summary of Disbursements and Repayments: Russian Federation, World Bank
Country Brief, EBRD Activities in Russia, Dept. of State U.S. Government Assistance to and
Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union: FY 1999
Annual Report (January 2000).
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Table 3: Russian Federation: Transactions with the IMF from May 1992 to September 30,
2005.
YEAR DISBURSEMENTS REPURCHASES CHARGES PAID
2005 0 2,293,770,240 18,064,962
2004 0 1,117,424,465 75,829,729
2003 0 1,356,065,590 100,706,947
2002 0 1,147,587,215 161,637,500
2001 0 2,997,937,522 398,106,279
2000 0 2,189,497,343 523,542,056
1999 471,429,000 3,101138,750 528,469,919
1998 4,600,000,000 673,921,875 528,876,040
1997 1,467,252,800 359,500,000 423,093,268
1996 2,587,861,200 359,500,000 323,567,770
1995 3,594,250,000 0 193,954,079
1994 1,078,275,000 0 122,264,400
1993 1,078,275,000 0 56,082,833
1992 719,000,000 0 0
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CHAPTER 5
THE RUSSIAN STUDY: CORRUPTION, MAFIA, AND IMPORTANT USE OF
LEGAL ENFORCEMENT VIA JUDICIAL AND LEGAL REFORM CHALLENGES
5.1. Corruption
Corruption is defined in the Black's Law Dictionary.112
Though corruption or its consistent criminal counterparts in the form of bribery and
extortion did exist in Soviet Russia as well as long before communism, in the Tzar's Russia, the
legal definition of corruption didn't exist in Russian law and could not be found in the Russian
Law Dictionary113 as it is in the American Black's Law Dictionary.
The first officially recognized definition of this legal term in Russia emerged only in 1997,
although, the word itself was widely known and used. Today corruption is recognized all over
the world as one of the most widespread, hard-to-fight aspects of criminal conduct. Today
corruption in Russia is a fairly normal part of everyday activities, business operations and
practices. It is, indeed, a heavy burden on the trustworthiness of the country and its governance
not only in the eyes of the world community, but also for the Russian population itself.
The World Bank defines corruption as the abuse of public power or public office for private
gain:
112 Under this definition, corruption is an act done with intent to give some advantage
inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others. It is also defined as the act of an official
or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some
benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 345 (6th ed.1990).
113 Uriditecheskiy Entsiklopediteskiy Slovar' [Encyclopedias Law Dictionary] (A. Y. Sucharev et
al.ed., Soviet Ensiclopedia, 2d ed. 1987) (Russ.) (1984).
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[w]hat is abuse of public power? The term ‘public power’ relates to the exercise
of government functions. Their abuse can be imputable to two different
perpetrators. The first one is the person who holds public office and exercises
government functions. The abuse can be the deed of this public official without
anybody else’s participation. The other perpetrator can be a person who seeks
to influence by inappropriate means the exercise of government functions that
he himself does not have. In this case, corruption is collusive behavior. As a
consequence, the abuse of public power comprises both configurations. Private
gain in this context is the change of the sound balance between public and
private interests (common good) during the decision making process in favor of
particular interests. As a consequence, neither the processes nor the outcomes
are equitable.114
Surprisingly, while the world is searching for measures to fight corruption and Russian
corruption in particular, Russia itself does not have a law on corruption. The legal database of
Russia has dramatically expanded since 1991 with many positive outcomes for the market
economy and the freedoms of an open society; however the fact remains –that the State Duma
did not adopt any specialized laws in its fight with corruption, notwithstanding that President
Putin is promising to fight corruption.
The first draft of the Federal Law “O bor'be s corruptsiei” (Law on the Fight against
Corruption) was introduced to the Duma on February 15, 1996. The State Duma adopted the law,
but president Yeltsin vetoed it. When the law was introduced to the Duma a second time, the
Duma canceled that session of its agenda.115
In total, the Duma made seven attempts to introduce and adopt this legislative draft.116
114 KLAUS DECKER ET AL., LAW OR JUSTICE: BUILDING EQUITABLE LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 6,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/477383-
1118673432908/Law_or_Justice_Building_Equitable_Legal_Institutions.pdf (last visited Nov.
30, 2005) [hereinafter LAW OR JUSTICE].
115 Ckandal.info, Kto napomnit Presidentu pro Korruptsiu?[Who will Remind the President
About Corruption?], Aug. 8, 2005 (Russ.), http://www.ckandal.info/main.html?news=1864 (last
visited Nov. 30, 2005).
116 Id.
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Much later another legal draft called “O protivodeistvii corruptsii” (About resistance to
corruption) was not turned down by the Duma, and was adopted in its first draft, i.e., in its first
reading by the chamber of the Russian Parliament on November 20, 2002. Since that time no
more attempts to adopt and enact it into a law have been made. Around April of 2005, President
Putin called for this draft’s adoption by the Duma. However, legislators decided to initiate the
drafting of an entirely different document from scratch rather than amend and improve the initial
project and move forward. How long it will take professionals to draft legislation on the fight
with corruption in Russia, adopt it and achieve the President’s ratification remains unknown.117
It is important to take into consideration that progressively oriented and concerned citizens
of Russia have noticed that there are two entirely parallel lines of thought in Russia. One is a
strong stance by legislators and government to prevent any and all attempts to design a
legislative framework for fighting corruption, whereas another line is that widespread corruption
has become pandemic and requires immediate measures.118
On the other hand, Some Russians argue that by simply enacting numerous laws and
regulations and presidential decrees on the fight with corruption would not be sufficient to
achieve a total victory in the combat with evil as a phenomenon. This group asserts that in the
overall war with corruption only the strongest will win. Ironically, that means the State and
Federal governments, which are overwhelmingly corrupted themselves.119
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Kompania, Pchelinaiya okchota. V totalnoi bor'be s korruptsiei pobezdaet silneishii. [Bees
Hunt. In a Total War on Corruption, Only the Strongest Will Win], Jan. 26, 2004 (Russ.),
http://www.compromat.ru/main/ne_rossiya/pchelin.htm.
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The evidence supporting this argument, first and foremost, is based on unproved assertion
which government has not rebutted: that former Prime–Minister Michael Kas'ianov was an
accomplice to and permitted suspicious financial transactions related to the Russian external
debt.120
The fact, that accusations were not rebutted by the government once again confirms that
Russia today is still too far away from openness, transparency and accountability of its
government to its own citizens.
The second piece of evidence supporting the argument is an assertion concerning the worth
of adopting legislations to fight corruption on the ground in Russia. The group believes that
simply adopting laws and regulations combating corruption will only once again give the power
to a few, and to the same decision-making bureaucrats in the government. The example used is
the historically well-known war on corruption launched in the U.S. in the 1970s, when the
mandate to fight corruption in the government was given to the U.S. Ministry of Justice. That is
where the article derives its headline from.121 However, the authors are making the same
mistake international donors did, but in the opposite direction. They are applying Russian reality
to the American soul.122 They sadly have no sense that it is possible to establish transparency in
the Russian Parliament and government as it exists in the U.S. Congress. The idea to build a base
for launching parliamentary investigations as has long been done in the U.S. now is in the
Russian air. Just recently in this year of 2005, president Putin publicly mentioned it would be
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See id.
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beneficial to launch a campaign for establishing an institute of parliamentary hearings. Today the
group of legislators is already drafting the law.123
However, the law on corruption is still in question.
Indeed, such lack of sense of the possibility of transparency in the Russian government is
not at all the fault of the author of the article, but just an unfortunate lack of information and a
lack of broad exchange between journalists and the ordinary people of Russia and America.
Nevertheless, Putin's call for parliamentary investigations sounds very ironic but timely in
view of the oil for food scandal and the oil allocations granted to the Russian Presidential
Council.124 The pro-Kremlin Unity Party known as the United Russia Party received the largest
oil allocations from Iraqi Saddam Hussein because it was the governing party and the party of
the President. The Russian Presidential Council also received a significant amount of oil
allocations under the management of Alexander Stalevich Voloshin, who was appointed to that
position initially by Yeltsin and stayed on with Putin. He reportedly assisted Putin to rise to
power. Mr. Voloshin is recognized as the most powerful man in Russia after Putin, and is a
guide for those who needed things to be “fixed” in the Kremlin.125
With all this said, indeed this concern of the Russian people does not sound surprising, and
must not be disregarded, but to the contrary, taken into full consideration. Indeed, there are ways
to decrease the adverse effects of corruption in Russia, and fight it with success while taking into
consideration the very unique and special corrupt political and economic environment. In those
123 See id.
124 OIL ALLOCATIONS REPORT, supra note 1.
125 Id. at 2-3.
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circumstances, the experience derived from the old days of the U.S. in the 1970s126 will never
hurt. Tactics and tools of combating corruption that now exist in the U.S. would only be
beneficial to all concerned Russians. The Russian people are incredibly smart and well-educated,
and if they put their mind to it, they will prevail in the war on corruption. However, it takes
courage and a very strong will, and they, indeed, will need continuous support from the U.S. and
the international community.
The recent August 2005 public opinion poll of the Russian population revealed a result not
at all surprising to a native of Russia and quite astonishing for a foreigner. To the question which
profession or occupation in Russia is the most criminal one, the answer is:127
The Second Runner-up is the so-called mafia under whose umbrella are united bandits, hit
men, killers, thieves, racketeers, gangsters and money launderers;
The First Runner-up is ministers and highly ranked governmental officials and legislators;
and
The winner is traffic control police officers (highway patrol) within law enforcement
(police) officers, and abbreviated in Russian as GIBDD (Gosudarstvennaya Inspektsiya po
Bezopasnosti Doroznogo Dvizenia) [Government's Inspection for Road and Traffic Safety or
Highway Patrol], called Gibbons128 for a reason.
The First Runner-up beat the Second Runner-up by 30%.129
The graphic description of the public opinion poll is presented in Figure 2.
126 See Kompania, supra note 119.
127 Ckandal.info, supra note 115.
128 Steve Rosenberg, The Scourge of Moscow’s Roads,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/europe/1420666.stm (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).
129 See supra note 115. See infra Figure 2.
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Information on corruption practices is available through an independent entity
“Transparency International – Russia”130 launched as a project in December 1999 and supported
financially by the Soros Foundation. At the conference held in Moscow, Russia on July 2005 the
investigation's results, Diagnostica Rossiiskoy Korryptsii 2001-2005 [The Diagnostic of Russian
Corruption 2001-2005], were announced. This is a very deep comprehensive statistical report
and analysis completed by talented and honest Russian scientists, mathematicians and
sociologists and available in Russian only. In Table 4 through Table 9 some of the data gathered
is presented, translated by the author of this thesis.131
Table 4 represents the opinion of Russian citizens in respect to the spread of corruption
during President Yeltsin’s and President Putin’s administrative terms. Thus public opinion shows
that in 2001 58% of respondents believed that Yeltsin's administration was highly corrupted.
Nothing has changed over the past few years and in 2005 on average 57.8% of Russian citizens
still believe that Yeltsin's administration was deeply corrupted. To the contrary, in 2001 after one
year of President Putin’s first term only 14.3% of respondents anticipated that Putin's
administration would be corrupt. Today, in 2005, 43.1% of respondents believe that Putin's
administration is highly corrupted. This represents a 201.4% increase among ordinary people in
respect to the number of respondents. Accordingly, in 2001 only 11% of businessmen thought
Putin's administration is corrupted. Today, in 2005, 37.6% of respondents from business circles
are clear about the depth of corruption in President Putin’s administration, which represents an
increase of 241.8%.
130 http://www.transparency.org.ru/PARTNERS/index.asp
131 IT-Russia, Vo skol'ko raz uvelitchilas korruptsiya za chetire goda: Resul'tati novogo
issledovania Fonda INDEM [ How much has Corruption Increased in the last 4 Years: The
Results of new study of the INDEM Fund], Jul. 20, 2005 (Russ.),
http://www.indem.ru/corrupt/2005diag_press.htm, See infra Table 4. – Table 9.
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Nonetheless, understanding of the process of corruption among people has drastically
improved. Table 5 presents data confirming that today more people understand corruption as a
negative social phenomenon. Among ordinary people, this advanced understanding improved
from 38.3% in 2001 to 52.6% in 2005, and among business people from 50.6% in 2001 up to
61.3% in 2005.
Table 6 reflects another phenomenon – reasons for bribe-giving have shifted over the past
few years. If in 2001 bribes were given more often at to the initiative of a giver, in 2005 givers
were not so comfortable or willing to give a bribe to the official. To the extreme, bribe takers
became more persistent and pushier, demanding bribes from business people and ordinary
citizens.
Table 7 uncovers the decreased intensity of corruption over the period 2001 to 2005, or
rather the decreased number of bribe-giving events. However, with the decreased number of
events, the size of bribes has increased drastically. The average bribe amount grew from
US$10,200 to US$1,358,000 in 2005. The size of the market where corruption is widespread has
increased from USD 33.5 billion in 2001 to USD 316 billion in 2005.
With all the negatives said, there are only a very insignificant number of positive
improvements presented in Table 8. Number of events in which a bribe was requested by an
official decreased slightly from 2001 to 2005 in certain areas of business cohabitation. For
instance, fiscal authorities and tax authorities obviously became less corrupt than before. In 2001
the number of events in which a bribe was requested was 19%, and in 2005 it is only 12.2%. All
other authorities are showing the same tendency for slowly progressing improvement as well,
excluding law enforcement. Here a slight increase in bribe demand is obvious.
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Table 9 contains characteristics of corruption in daily life of Russia versus the business
environment as presented in Table 8. The trend is obvious: corruption is spreading, and the risks
of finding oneself in the situation of being forced to give a bribe are increasing. However, the
willingness of the average citizen to give a bribe has diminished.
Corruption has an evil face and is very difficult to fight. Public judicial proceedings and
their expansive representation in mass media could help the legislative process in the combat
against corruption.
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Fig. 2. Russian Federation, Results of Public Opinion Poll, August 2005.
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Table 4. Public Answer to the Question: “When Do You Believe that Corruption, Bribe-
Taking, Embezzlement of Governmental and Public Funds, Special-Interest Protectionism,
and the Godfather Patronage System Were Most Widespread in Russia?”
Ordinary citizens BusinesmenVariations of responses
suggested
2001 2005 Δ 2001 2005 Δ
During the presidency of
Boris Yeltsin
58.0 57.8 -0.3 57.3 53.8 -6.1
At the present time under
the presidency of
Vladimir Putin
14.3 43.1 201.4 11.0 37.6 241.8
Table 5. Understanding of Corruption as Social Phenomena by Russians.
Ordinary citizens BusinessmenLevel of understanding of
corruption processes
2001
%
2005
%
2001
%
2005
%
Advanced and Systemic
level of understanding
38.3 52.6 50.6 61.3
Ordinary level of
understanding
41.9 39.8 36.5 33.6
Absence of understanding 19.8 7.5 12.8 5.1
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Table 6. Reasons for Offering Bribes.
Responses variations 2001, % 2005, %
A Bureaucrat insisted on bribe (gave a
hint, created circumstances) 17.4 25,1
Bribe giver knew in advance this matter
could not be solved without a bribe
giving
57.2 54.2
A Bureaucrat did not insist on bribe ,
but bribe giver decided it could secure
resolution of an issue
20.3 18.3
Not sure or refused to answer 5.1 2.4
Table 7. Characteristics and Dynamics of Corruption in Business Practices of Russia, 2005.
(positive number reflects increase in the activity)
Characterized as 2001 2005 Δ
Intensity of corruption (average amount of bribes
given) 2.248 1.795 -20.2
Average size of a bribe (in US$K) 10.2 135.8 1231.4
Yearly combined bribe size (in US$K) 22.9 243.75 964.4
Size of the market (in US$ billions) 33.5 316 843.3
Size of the apartment which could be purchased
using one average bribe (sq. meters) 30 209 596.7
Ratio of volume of business corruption to gross
Revenue of Federal Budget 0.66 2.66 303.0
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Table 8. Percentile Representation of the Last Occurrence of Business People's Experience
in Regard to Communication with Authorities Involved in Corruption Practices. Based on
Type of Authority.
Response variations 2001
%
2005
%
Non fiscal control, Supervising Authority 39.5 38.9
Fiscal, Taxes Collecting Authorities 19 12.2
Licensing Authorities 19 16.4
Customs Control Authorities 4.2 1.2
Law Enforcement Authorities 10.5 11.8
Other 3.3 3
Not sure or refused to answer 4.5 16.5
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Table 9. Corrupt Practices in Daily Life in Russia. Dynamics of Corrupt Practices in Daily
Life in National Market.
Charctersistcs of Corruption 2001 2005
Spread of Corruption (%) 50.4 54.9
Corruption's Risks (%) 25.7 35.0
Demand for Corruption (preparedness to give a bribe, %) 74.7 53.2
Intensity of Corruption (average number of bribes given per
year per giver)
1.19 0.882
Average size of a bribe in rubles (US$1=29.845 Ruble) 1,817 2,780
Proportion of an average bribe to the minimum poverty level 1.21 1.17
in 2004
Average Yearly contribution of one bribe giver in rubles
(US$1=29.845 Ruble)
2,162 2,452
Yearly Volume of Corrupt Practices in Daily Life (billions of
US Dollars)
2.825 3.014
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5.2. Mafia
The mafia is a phenomenon of Russian reality and still remains an enigma to the world
despite of everything written about it.
From one person's criminal activity (like Jesse James132 and John Dillinger,133 for example)
or a small group of thieves or killers, it progressed to become big, well-organized groups of
individuals carrying out criminal intent and united under an umbrella of criminal organizations,
often with a structure like a real corporation. Those groups could be organized and coordinated
not only on the national scale of a particular country, but often internationally.
The presence of an organizational structure led these groups to be called organized crime
(OC). Not necessarily as family-based as the Italian mafia’; the Russian mafia is protected by
corrupt politicians and law enforcement officers, the legal advice of law practitioners and flaws
in the legal and economic environment of the country.134
The days when money derived only from such activities as gambling, prostitution, and the
illicit use of narcotics are long gone. The new Russian mafia specializes in oil, nuclear materials,
military and defense arms equipment, the sale of defense secrets, tanks, aircraft and submarines,
and the more peaceful but equally profitable and competitive sugar, coffee, cotton and liquor
trades, as well as gold, steel and aluminum are also among the mafia's interest. Anything which
can bring important or lesser sums of money is the focal point of the mafia’s routine activities.
132 T. J. STILES , JESSE JAMES: LAST REBEL OF THE CIVIL WAR (2002).
133 For more information, see generally DARY MATERA, JOHN DILLINGER: THE LIFE AND
DEATH OF AMERICA'S FIRST CELEBRITY CRIMINAL (2004).
134 See U.S. LAWYERS FOR RUSSIAN MOBS, supra note 84.
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During the Cold War the Russian mafia used its connections in the Communist Party to
establish a vast black market network. In the power vacuum that followed the fall of
communism, the brutal group became even wealthier, more influential, and more successful. The
meaning of the word mafia had dramatically changed over the years in Russia.135
If in Soviet times the qualification to become a mafia boss was the honor to be a Vor V
Zakone (meaning thief at law, on the model of Attorney at law) or a hit killer, who had little
property and was valued by the length of time he had served in a prison or Gulag, then in post-
Soviet times the mafia became very diversified.136 Among thieves and Vor V Zakone, the more
intelligent people who did not have prior criminal records became familiar faces. Officers and
soldiers who served in Afghanistan or elsewhere and even members of the GRU
(Gosudarstvennoe razvedivatelnoe Upravlenie, Army intelligence) or the KGB (now known as
the FSB) intelligence fill the ranks of the army of mafia and OC groups.137 Educated, smart,
diversified, pervasive, prepared for a fight and hard times, these soldiers made OC especially
dangerous. At some point it became prestigious to belong to a mafia group. Many youngsters
were curious about it, looking for easy ways to get rich and be 'recognized' by alike.
Members of the Russian Mafia often lead outwardly respectable lives and maintain a variety
of legitimate businesses as a front, or cover, for their criminal activities.
The scale of involvement of population in criminal activities was absolutely astonishing.
In 1992 it was determined that as many as 1,684 criminal groups were located in Moscow
and its suburbs. However, only 11 of those were qualified by the courts as criminal groups
135 Id.
136 Valeriy Karishev, Istoria Russkoi Mafii 1995-2003 Bol'shiaya Krisha [The History of Russian
Mafia 1995-2003 The Big Roof] (2004) (Russ.).
137 Id.
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equaling the definition of bandits. The reason was that judges were afraid of consequences. In
1993 in Moscow alone, 352 groups were liquidated by law enforcement. Nevertheless, it didn't
help to release the tension of the criminal burden in the Capital of Russia. New soldiers came to
replace the old ones. No one wanted to work in factories or bake bread, and the government did
not pay salaries. Department store shelves were empty. Normal food was only in dreams. The
solution could have come then, if the economic situation had been normalized and civilized.
Criminals would then have left racketeering of legal businesses and would have had to return
back to their standard mafia practices of narcotics, prostitution and gambling.138
In 1997 organized crime (OC) was recognized as the first priority for problem-solving.
According to the statistics about 16,000 criminal groups of different sizes plus 60,000
individuals closely related to them were operating just in Moscow and its suburbs.139
The average perception is that mafia or OC is a group of sporty-looking young men with
very short hair, visiting the gym on a regular basis and sometimes with nice, quiet families or
very intelligent, law-abiding parents very much of the old school. However, in the mid-1990s it
became clear, though no one wanted to admit it, that the mafia emerged as a new phenomenon
with a new and entirely different face. A new type of mafia has surfaced – a white-collar mafia,
practicing financial and banking crime, privatization crime, computer crime and a long list of
other kinds. According to CIA information, about ten of the largest and most influential Russian
banks participated on a wide scale in unlawful and criminal activities, money transfers and
138 Id.
139 Id.
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money laundering. About 30-40% of GDP (natsionalnogo valovogo producta) was produced
exclusively on the black market.140 The mobster emerged.
One of the figures of the Russian mafia with international roots was a mobster originating in
Russia with the nickname 'Yaponchik', a famous Vor V Zakone, who arrived in the U.S. in 1992
as a crew member of a cinema group and stayed. He planted his roots in Brooklyn, New York
and continued to preside over as one of the most recognized mobs ever. However he was a mob
in the old style with his personal “Code of Honor”. It took hard work, but when he was caught by
the FBI, imprisoned and finally extradited to Russia, the event was announced as one of the most
significant successes of the FBI’s work in combating international organized crime.141
5.3. Judicial and Legal Reform Challenges
The legal system of the Soviet Union is famous for centralism, protection of interests of the
States' super power versus rights, interests and needs of the private individuals who form that
sovereign State and who unite under its jurisdiction, and whom they call “my Motherland”
whether born in Russia or through adopting its citizenship. For those who were born and raised
an the open society and free market economy, it is practically impossible to comprehend the
depth of damage done to the human mind by 70 years of the communist regime and
brainwashing with socialist ideas under the Soviet regime. Normal values of human well-being
and recognition of basic human rights were distorted to the point of not acknowledging them at
all.
There was a very famous slogan during Soviet times: “Ran’she dumai or Rodine, a potom o
sebe”. The literal translation is: First, think about the interests of the State, and then after that
140 Id.
141 Id.
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about your personal interests. This can be interpreted as: “Dear Citizen, it is not about your rights
and interests that the Federal Government pledged to recognize and protect, it’s only about the
interest of the Federal Government, and if any room is left then, maybe, perhaps, it is about some
of your interests. But we will see how it turns out, no promises, and, indeed, only in case we
decide to think at all about your interests.”
That is the environment people in the Soviet Union used to live in, from 1917 until
Gorbachev's perestroika began.
One of the most significant achievements of perestroika was not in fact the building of the
road to economic freedom, stability and a free market environment. The most substantial
achievement of perestroika was the recognition of human rights, interests and needs. Recognized
human rights include but are not limited to the right and protections of ownership, the right to
move freely and to choose freely one’s new residence or motherland, the freedom to exchange,
sell or buy real estate, the right to a fair court hearing, freedom of religion, and so on.
In order to protect human rights, the historically proven system of checks and balances, the
independent judiciary, a strong legal environment, an independent legislative branch and a
system of legal enforcement with a strong law enforcement division within the legal system
versus the police state system must exist.
The architectural development of this bright-featured house of recognized and valued
human rights under the umbrella of equal justice for all takes time and money. First, the
projected aim must be set, whether a two-bedroom house in Beverly Hills or the palace of
Versailles. Then the architectural draft must be drawn, the basement cemented, communication
systems (gas pipeline, water, sewer, cables, drainage) provided, walls erected, heating and
cooling systems installed, ventilation system or chimneys cleaned, roofing covered and sealed,
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windows for lights, air and new ideas arranged...And when construction seems to be over, the
interior design will be another challenge to meet.
Thus the legal system. In Russia after the post-Soviet era, the old system is not serving new
demands, and a lot of hard work must be performed. For this work to be successful, plans must
be developed and mutually accepted by the participants, financing must be obtained and the
work must begin as scheduled.
However, a range of difficulties have delayed the constituting of parts of the project, as the
complexity of the task as a whole is enormous.
At the beginning of perestroika, when it became obvious that the existing legal system had
no capacity to meet the new requirements of a changing society, plans for a legal revolution were
conceived.
The breakthrough occurred in July 1991 when a new law was passed in the legislature and
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation was born.142 In October, later in the very same
year, legislators approved The Concept of Judicial Reform, a very revolutionary document.143
Then in 1993 the new Constitution of independent Russia was drafted and enacted.144 On
October 21, 1994 the first Part of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation was adopted by the
Duma, a chamber of the Federal Parliament, and on December 22, 1995 the second Part of the
Civil Code of the Russian Federation.145 In large measure, the analogy between the U.S.
Commercial Code and the Civil Code of the Russian Federation could be drawn. The enacting of
this most significant, comprehensive and literally revolutionary law providing legal cornerstones
142 For more information, see generally Peter H. Solomon, Law and Courts in Post-Soviet
Russia, paper presented Dec. 3, 1999 at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., at 2.
143 RUSSIAN OUTLOOK, supra note 11.
144 Id.
145 Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] (Russ.).
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not only for commercial purposes, but everyday life in respect to rights and types of ownership
including real estate and land; contracts; legal forms of business entities; remedies including but
not limited to restitution, repossession, fines, penalties; intellectual property rights; tangible and
intangible property rights, and so much more. The significance of its impact on Russian society
when the law came into existence is impossible to overestimate.
Between 1995 and 2000, both politics and the economy impeded further legal revolution.
However, both the passage of new laws and the implementation of those adopted in 1991-1995
suffered not only from the "cold civil war" between the pro-reform president and a parliament
dominated at that time by the reactionary hard-line Left, which voted down or blocked laws
submitted by the Kremlin, but also from actions of local authorities and law enforcement entities.
Society was operating without further enhancing and clarifying existing and newly enacted
legislation. Thus it took about two years and a plethora of by-laws for many provisions of the
Civil Code to be adopted, accepted, recognized and used not only by the general public but by
local officials including law enforcement officers and government officials in districts, cities,
regions and republics. Not only the Civil Code went through a troubled recognition and
acceptance, but a post-Soviet Criminal Code146 as well, and several key provisions of the
Constitution—most conspicuously court-sanctioned arrests search, and seizure - could not be put
into effect for a long time.147
Taking advantage of the infighting in the Center and the Kremlin's limited economic power,
many regions continuously violated both: the Constitution and Federal laws. Thus Moscow's
very popular and powerful mayor and bright pro-reformist Mr. Luzkov ignored the rulings of the
146 Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] (Russ.).
147 RUSSIAN OUTLOOK, supra note 11.
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Constitutional Court and continued for a very long time to restrict the right of residence under
the guise of registration148 in the city of Moscow.
Legal implementation and enforcement also suffered tremendously from a lack of funding
as Russia coped with the legacy of the Soviet economic collapse, an empty treasury, enormous
subsidies to money-losing enterprises, and the absence of a modern tax system, which had to be
created from scratch. The shortage of means precluded raising meager judicial salaries,
appointing the thousands of new judges needed to exercise court review of the procuracy's (like
district attorneys’) actions, and enforcing the constitutional right to a jury trial or to defense
counsel immediately after arrest and before questioning.149
To address such deficiencies, in December 2001 the Russian parliament passed, and
President Vladimir Putin signed, four laws critical of the legal revolution: two laws dealing with
judges' qualifications, appointment procedures, retirement age, and administrative, civil, and
criminal liability; a law on compliance with decisions of the Constitutional Court; and, most
importantly, a law that put into effect the post-Soviet Criminal-Procedural Code.150
The legislative package was the product of almost two years of work by a group of
progressive jurists.
Another crucial step in legal enforcement was the amendment made to the Law concerning
the Constitutional Court. This amendment requires all executive branches within two months to
abolish a law or regulation found by the Constitutional Court to be unconstitutional. The
executive branch includes but is not limited to districts, regional authorities of different levels up
to the head of the region or republic him/herself and the president of Russia.
Noncompliance could result in the dismissal of the executive.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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The refusal of a local legislature to pass necessary laws could lead to its dissolution.151
Among the most ingrained defects of the Russian judiciary since perestroika were: wide
exposure to the influence of corrupt individuals, criminals and officials; bribing and intimidation
of lawyers, attorneys, judges, prosecutors and investigators; low salaries and long delays in their
deliveries from the government; unavailability of legal information, which when available was
often very confusing; weekly, sometimes daily changes in legal codes, laws, and regulations to
the point of making them almost impossible to track; huge contradictions among regional and
federal laws and regulations, as well as presidential decrees;152 insufficient education and
training; extremely poor computerization and absence of other necessary equipment, furniture
and supplies; not enough databases or network connection, and ramshackle buildings where
courts preside.
A lot has been done by 2005 to improve the situation. Nonetheless, without the capacity to
implement and to enforce laws, regulations, reforms, initiatives, improvements are blunted. The
impression Russia leaves over the years of legal reform efforts is that there is no rush for legal
empowerment.
150 Id.
151 Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation], [Federal'nyi konstitutsionnyi zakon, "O vnesenii izmeneniy I dopolneniy v
federal'nyi konstitutsionniy zakon 'O konstitutsionnom sude Rossiyskoy Federatsii'" (The federal
constitutional law, On the introduction of changes and amendments to the federal constitutional
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http://www.akdi.ru/gd/proekt (last visited Jan. 30, 2002).
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CHAPTER 6
THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF IN LEGAL REFORM IN
RUSSIA. PROSPECTIVE OUTLOOK
Although as of 2000 the IMF was no longer financing the Russian Federation, the external
debt had been restructured.153 Moreover, many projects on legal reform in Russia financed by the
World Bank prior to 2000 are not so financed any more, some projects came to an end, and some
just simply do not exist for unknown reasons. For instance, the Russian Foundation for Legal
Reform (RFLR),154 which was responsible for distribution of the World Bank loan to Russia
aimed at legal reform, does not support its own website since 2002, and it is almost impossible to
find any other links or news to track its transformation, if any. Indeed, its effectiveness was
already questioned in 1999.
Was it widespread corruption in Russia, the presence of mafia in all walks of society,
financial scandals, continuing economic and legal instability155 , lack of cultural understanding of
the Russian soul and culture in the 1990s, overall overconfidence in the superiority of foreign
institutions, weak internal policy on accountability and poor understanding of causal links
between legal and economic reforms in the transitioning society, overwhelming ignorance of
political realities on the ground156 and overconfidence in one leader (Yeltsin)157 that made the
World Bank vulnerable to failure in Russian legal reform, revealing the need for drastic changes?
Hence it remains true that the World Bank in Russia sadly repeated its previous mistakes in its
153 See IMF TRANSACTIONS, supra note 88; see also infra Table 3.
154 Princeton Project Report, supra note 64, at 20.
155 Road to Corruption, supra note 4.
156 Princeton Project Report, supra note 64, at 18.
157 Road to Corruption, supra note 4.
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legal reform projects in other sovereign countries in the mid-1970s.158 This is a disappointment
of a great magnitude.
Nevertheless,
[R]ecognition of the ancillary role of foreign aid might have been one of the
most important strengths of the World Bank's approach. By cooperating closely
with the Russian government, and by adopting a Russian implementation
agency, the World Bank avoided the pitfall, common to many legal reform
projects in Russia, of relying too much on Western models, Western thinking
and Western experts.159
It remains questionable why the World Bank cut financing of legal reform in Russia so
drastically. Was it due to their own failures or the change of power on December 31, 1999 from
Yeltsin to Putin; or, perhaps, due to the critique by the international community and the obvious
necessity to revise their own policies on lending; or the continued pressure from the U.S after the
2000 Senate hearings?160
While the answer would serve the purpose of satisfying a curious mind, the facts remain:
since 2000 the World Bank and the IMF have undertaken many efforts to improve their own by-
laws and regulations. Principles of transparency, conditionality and accountability were
introduced and further enhanced. Substantial work in different fields with legal involvement has
been conducted all over the world. Numerous conferences on this subject matter have been held,
issues addressed, analytical papers produced, and public discussions generated.
If in previous years the World Bank and the IMF didn't strongly emphasize the importance
of legal reform and legal enforcement, nowadays it has become an issue of the greatest
158 Princeton Project Report, supra note 64, at 18.
159 Id. at 72.
160 Road to Corruption, supra note 4.
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significance. “It is now widely accepted that the ‘rule of law’ is key to sustainable
development.”161
The World Bank admits that the meaning of ‘rule of law’ has yet to be more deeply
identified in its entirety. Therefore in today’s approach it is divided into an idealistic model and a
real model in its entirety. In different countries ‘rule of law’ carries different layers of meaning
and definitely different approaches to building and establishing it sufficiently.
[W]ithin an idealized ‘rule of law’ system, equitable legal and regulatory
institutions operate as safeguards against abuses of state and non-state power
while well-functioning regulatory frameworks are crucial for the effective
delivery of public services. A ‘rule of law’ system is generally characterized by
multiple arms of government - the executive, legislative and judiciary - with
each branch holding the others accountable through differing ‘checks and
balances’. The separation of powers principle aims to combat the dangers of
investing state power in one person or group. The judicial branch, in particular,
exists to protect citizens against the arbitrary or inequitable use of political or
economic power. Further, predictable and fair ‘rules of the game’ and secure
legal rights are seen as the basis for an effectively functioning society.162
Further the World Bank acknowledges that the building of equitable, accessible legal
institutions should be priority number one for enhancing economic growth and development, as
well as the millennium goal of poverty reduction. The inequitable legal institutions and subverted
courts on the other hand allow a financially or politically strong elite to prevail in any court case
brought against them.163 “The absence of effective sanctions may also mean that those in
positions of power pursue socially harmful acts that are in their self-interest.”164 The main reason
161 KLAUS DECKER ET AL., LAW OR JUSTICE: BUILDING EQUITABLE LEGAL INSTITUTIONS,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/477383-
1118673432908/Law_or_Justice_Building_Equitable_Legal_Institutions.pdf (last visited Nov.
30, 2005) [hereinafter LAW OR JUSTICE].
162 Id. at 6.
163 Id. at 7.
164 For a discussion of the causal relationship between inequality and injustice, see EDWARD
GLAESER ET AL., THE INJUSTICE OF INEQUALITY (2002),
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for such ignorance is that those individuals recognize that legal, political, and regulatory systems
will not hold them accountable.
The World Bank also is clear in its understanding of:
[t]he rise of oligarchs in transition countries, who managed to manipulate
politicians and shape institutions to advance their own privilege and extract
rents from the state at the expense of the social interest. The unbridled capture
of economic gains in these countries also led to a substantial breakdown in law
and order.165
It is imperative that both multilateral institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, continue to
work toward such important issues as legal reform and legal enforcement via Justice Sector
Reform (JSR)166 while seeking consensus with member countries. They must do this through
their own means to continue positive practices of protecting the interests of the general public
whom individuals in the government represent, but not always with the required devotion, honor
and dignity needed to promote good governance all over the Globe.
The agenda of continuing funding of legal reform and legal enforcement through the
legislative branch, the judicial branch, other government bodies, presidential power, law
enforcement, tax enforcement agencies, the setting of legal standards and ways of limiting the
power of the state versus the power of the private sector, and via broad legal education of the
general public of Russia must again become again a focal point of the World Bank and the IMF
activities. Furthermore, the IMF could reconsider today’s' strict policy on lending to Russia and
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papers/inequalityWP.pdf.
165 LAW OR JUSTICE, supra note 161, at 8. For a full list of related studies and research papers, see
J. Hellman, G. Jones, and D. Kaufmann, World Bank Institute,
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/wp-governance.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
166 Id.
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by strictly applying the principle of conditionality could require the Russian government to take
responsibility and accountability for its actions, to develop the necessary plans to implement and
enforce the rule of law in the Russian Federation by balancing domestic interests with
internationally recognized practices and principles.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS
The adverse lending policy of the IMF and the World Bank to Russia in transition in the
middle of the 1990s brought enormous debt to the Russian nation due to the huge misuse of
international loans. Nevertheless, not only must the Russian government be blamed for the
misuse of money given to it from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
leading to widespread and sophisticated corruption, global money laundering, extortion,
racketeering, poverty; political, economic and military instability, and the failure of a large
number of internationally financed programs in Russia. Proportional responsibility must be
undertaken by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) themselves, as well
as the U.S.
To repair the damage incurred all parties should have to negotiate appropriate measures
based on mutual interest and consensus.
Notwithstanding other important and urgent issues and tasks that the global community and
multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank are facing,
two major actions could be considered as a goodwill option and a necessary step for their better
performance for the global good.
In addition to developing rule of law programs via Justice Sector Reform (JSR) to
strengthen the legislative process, judiciary, legal implementation, and law enforcement all over
the world (1), there is also a need to initiate an inside project between the two multilateral
institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in order to develop
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inside by-laws and regulations meeting the rapidly changing needs of globalization. Since the
time of the Bretton Woods charter, so much has changed, thus there is a role for the World Bank
and the IMF. Part of the named project may include provisions to create better mechanisms of
tracking by the World Bank and the IMF to follow how money lent by them is spent by each
country, and the first guinea pig would be the Russian Federation. Such by-laws and regulations
will, hopefully, find the support of concerned members who make up the vast majority of the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
It would be particularly helpful to Russia if the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) would not only help with developing programs and financing targeting
improvements in the legislation progress, law drafting and public discussions for better support
of the open society and the open market economy, and but also in keeping and supporting legal
databases, improving judiciary, law enforcement, and most importantly, launching and financing
the broad and very expansive process of legal education of the peoples of Russia.
For a very long time the population of Russia was ignorant toward the law in the totalitarian
communist era. There was no national culture of respect toward the law; there was no trust in
law, and the weakest experience of the law was legal enforcement and legal implementation.
The Russian people still barely believe that justice could be fairly served, could prevail, and
could be accessible for all.
The peoples of Russia are still having problems adjusting to the new leadership. Even
nowadays after nearly 15 years of perestroika the judicial branch is still not strong and speedy
enough; quite often courts are corrupted; therefore, people do not feel free and comfortable
enough to go to the courts and address their issues and concerns, as they do in America.
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Trust is a very delicate and important issue. The Russians lost a lot of trust in Russia
through the Yeltsin government, its corruption and his connections with mafia rule. Trust is
easily lost, but incredibly hard to restore. Russia needs to restore the nation’s trust in itself.
Another interesting aspect of implementing rule of law is in the development and
introduction of class action lawsuits like those in America. The money stolen by the Yeltsin
administration from all Russian citizens after the fall of the Soviet Union in Michael
Gorbachev’s presidency is a good example, as the government of Russia became very rich within
days in 1991 leaving the vest majority of the Russian people without life savings. The same is
applicable to the default of August of 1998, and the government never answered their own
people's enquiry concerning the default caused directly by the overwhelming outstanding debt of
Russia to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Class action legal
practices must be broadly introduced to Russian lawyers, consumer advocates and the general
public.
Another opportunity is more deeply developed and powerfully implemented consumer’s
protection laws.
The next way to improve and strengthen the legal system and legal enforcement is by
widening and broadening the exchange among judges as well as regular lawyers from different
branches and practices of law, and different geographical regions (local municipal courts and
local chapters lawyers especially), and also through law study abroad, having law students study
a semester in an American law school (although funding would have to be made more widely
available and accessible), and through summer schools or internships in the courts and law firms
being made bigger, broader, and more extensive to get the best and the hardest work out of those
studying law.
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The funds from the World Bank and explicit support of the International Monetary Fund
may be and should be widely available to fulfill such important tasks.
Another serious aspect to consider is creating a mechanism for repatriation of the embezzled
funds, as well as publicity and transparency of those precedents for the global community. This
way the peoples of the Universe will be able to reestablish their confidence in justice and fairness
and accountability of their governments. Not only the American taxpayers who assume a
tradition of responsibility and accountability, but the taxpayers of other countries including
Russia would feel more secure knowing that each and every government or business entity may
be held accountable for misusing international funds. Indeed, a very complex issue of
jurisdiction will rise, concerning laws applicable and ways to implement such a provisions.
However, only about one hundred years ago people could not even dream of flying, and only
about two decades ago the world was introduced to the computer, and just ten years ago the
internet. Today we can not even imagine world without airplanes, computers and World Wide
Web. Thus with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The multinational
campaign could be discussed and launched to develop new specialized international institution
for economic disputes resolution alike but servicing different purpose then the International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) of the World Bank Group, it also could be
a specialized structure, department or institution within existing ICSID. This new creation would
help to solve disputes between peoples of nation and their governments in regards to the
suspected or possible misuse of international funds.
In the changing world, the IMF and the World Bank need have no fear of changing either.
83
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
 Sebastian Mallaby, the World's Banker: A Story of Failed States, Financial Crises, and
the Wealth and Poverty of Nations, 480 (2004).
 Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: 1883-1946: Economist, Philosopher, Statesman
(2005).
 Paul McCluer, a Guide to the World Bank (2003).
 Margaret Garristen De Vries, the IMF in a Changing World, 1945-85 (1986).
 George W. Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (2002).
 Lilla Shevtsova, Putin's Russia (2003).
 Vagiph Guseinov, Ot Yeltsina K...? Chronika Tainoi Bor'bi [From Yeltsin To...? The
Chronicle of Hidden Fight] (1999) (Russ.).
 Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed., West Group 1990) (1891).
 Uriditecheskiy Entsiklopediteskiy Slovar' [Encyclopedias Law Dictionary] (A. Y.
Sucharev Et al.ed., Soviet Ensiclopedia, 2d ed. 1987) (Mosc. Russ) (1984).
 Dary Matera, John Dillinger: The Life and Death of America's First Celebrity Criminal
(2004).
 T. J. Stiles , Jesse James: Last Rebel of the Civil War (2002)
 Valeriy Karishev, Istoria Russkoi Mafii 1995-2003 Bol'shiaya Krisha [The History of
Russian Mafia 1995-2003 The Big Roof] (2004) (Russ.).
84
Reports:
 Majority and Minority Staffs of the Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations, Comm. On
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Congress, Report on Oil
Allocations Granted to the Russian Presidential Council (comm. Print 2005), available at
<http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/psirussianpresidentialcounselreport.pdf>
 Role of the U.S. Correspondent Banking in International Money Laundering: Hearing
before the Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations of the Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 107th Cong. 273 (2001) (appendix), available at <http:
//www.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate12sh107.html.>
 Russia's Road to Corruption, Speaker’s Advisory Group on Russia, 106th Cong. (2000)
(presentation by Rep. Christopher Cox, Chairman, House Policy Comm.), available at
http://www.fas.org/news/russia/2000/russia/index.html.
 Russia's Transition to Democracy and U.S. - Russia Relations: Unfinished Business:
Hearing on H.R. 108-54 before the Subcomm. on Europe of the Comm. on International
Relations, 108th Cong. 1 (2003), available at <http://wwwc.house.gov/
international_relations/108/89668.PDF>
Periodicals
 Colleen DeBaise, Appeals Court Reinstates Embezzlement Suit Vs Bank of NY, Dow
Jones News Service, Jan. 15, 2002, available at <http://russianlaw.org/ dj011502.htm>
 Leon Aron, Russia Reinvents the Rule of Law, Russian Outlook, Mar. 20, 2002, available
at <http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.13781/pub_detail.asp>
85
 Arnold Beichman, Guilty as Charged, Hoover Digest, 1999, available at
<http://www.hooverdigest.org/992/beichman.html> (reprinted with permission of the
Weekly Standard, which first published the article on Dec. 14, 1998).
 Joscelyn Jurich, Evolution of Russia, Ex-Communist Media Examined, Overseas Press
Club of America, available at
<http://www.opcofamerica.org/press_freedom/articles/110705_russiaevolution.php>
 Nikolay Petrov, Putin's Reforms Are Dangerous for Russia, The Moscow Times, Sept.
15, 2004, available at <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/09/15/006.html.>
 Monika Borbely et al., Project Report on the Role of Foreign Aid for Legal Reform
Programs in the Russian Federation, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International
Affairs, Princeton University (Jan.1999), available at
<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/projectreport.pdf>
 Edward Glaeser et al., The Injustice of Inequality (2002), available at
<http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/papers/inequalityWP.pdf>
 Russian Law Institute, U.S. Lawyers Hired as Spin Doctors for Russian Mobs,
<http://www.russianlaw.org/004.htm and http://www.russianlaw.org/crisis.htm>
 Peter H. Solomon, Law and Courts in Post-Soviet Russia, paper presented Dec. 3, 1999 at
the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, and D.C.
International Materials
 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, available at
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa08.htm>
86
 A Factsheet: the IMF at a Glance, International Monetary Fund (2005),
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glance.htm>
 Rodrigo de Rato, Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, Address at the
Circulo de Economía: Globalization and the New Priorities of the IMF (Oct. 20, 2005)
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2005/102005a.htm>
 World Bank Publications, World Bank Group Organizational Directory (1993).
 The Struggle for Accountability: the World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements
(Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds.), (1998).
 International Monetary Fund, Policy Development and Review Department,
Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs, Overview (2001),
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/overview/index.htm>
 The World Bank, the World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information (2002) available at
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ EXTARCHIVES/ Resources/ Disclosure
Policy.pdf>
 World Bank, Eligibility of Expenditures in World Bank Lending: a New Policy
Framework, <http://www1.worldbank.org/ operations/eligibility/documents/ March26
ExpenditureEligibilityBoardPaper.pdf>
 International Monetary Fund, Communiqué of the Interim Committee of the Board of
Governors of the International Monetary Fund (1998),
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/cm/1998/041698a.htm>
 International Monetary Fund, Policy Development and Review Department, The
Standards and Codes Initiative- Is it Effective? And How can it be Improved?: (2005),
Background Paper available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/070105b.htm
87
 International Monetary Fund, Evaluation of Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported
Programs: Issues Paper for an Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)
(2005) available at <http://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2005/sc/051805.pdf>
 World Bank, Operational Manual.
 International Monetary Fund, A Factsheet: IMF Quotas, available at
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm>
 Klaus Decker et al., Law or Justice: Building Equitable Legal Institutions, available at
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/477383-
1118673432908/Law_or_Justice_Building_Equitable_Legal_Institutions.pdf>
 International Monetary Fund, Russian Federation: Selected Issues (2005), available at
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05379.pdf>
 The World Bank Group, Legal Institutions of the Market Economy, available at
<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/index.cfm.>
 Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the
Issues, 14 World Bank Res. Observer 117, 117-36(1999), available at
<http://www.worldbank.org/research/journals/wbro/obsfeb99/pdf/article6.pdf.>
 Richard E. Messick, International Support for Civil Justice Reform in Developing and
Transition Countries: An Overview and Evaluation (2000), available at
<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/donorsupported.doc>
 U.S. Financial Aid to Russia (2000) from IMF Summary of Disbursement and payments.
FY 1999 Annual Report (January 2000).
88
 International Monetary Fund, Russian Federation: Transactions with the Fund from May
01, 1984 to October 31, 2005 available at <http://www.imf.org/external/
country/RUS/index.htm>
 USAID, Data Sheet (2005), available at
<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/ee/pdf/118-0221.pdf>
 J. Hellman, G. Jones, and D. Kaufmann, World Bank Institute, available at
<www.worldbank.org/ wbi/governance/wp-governance.html>
 Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] (Russ.).
 Ugolovnyi Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] (Russ.).
 Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection
of Legislation], [Federal'nyi konstitutsionnyi zakon, "O vnesenii izmeneniy I dopolneniy
v federal'nyi konstitutsionniy zakon 'O konstitutsionnom sude Rossiyskoy Federatsii'"
(The federal constitutional law, On the introduction of changes and amendments to the
federal constitutional law "On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation")]
2001, available at <http://www.akdi.ru/gd/proekt>
Web-sites
 The World Bank, Russian Federation: Ten Things You Never Knew about the World
Bank in Russia,
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/RUSSIANF
EDERATIONEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20251181~menuPK:517710~pagePK:1497618~piP
K:217854~theSitePK:305600,00.html>
89
 Federal State Statistic Service, Death Rates by Main Classes of Causes of
<http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b05_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/05-07.htm>
 Federal State Statistic Service, Subsistence Minimum Level,
<http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b05_12/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d000/07-13.htm>
 American Russian Law Institute, <http://www.russianlaw.org.>
 University Diary, <http://margaretsoltan.phenominet.com/2004/06/this-heres-big-ol-
russki-oil-platform.html>
 Rural Development Institute, Market Development,
<http://www.rdiland.org/CONSULTING/Consulting_topic_Market.html>
 American Bar Association, http: //www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/russia/home.html.>
 USAID, <http://www.usaid.ru/en/main/activity/index.shtml?activity_id=644 and
http://www.chemonics.com>
 Ckandal.info, Kto napomnit Presidentu pro Korruptsiu? [Who will remind President
about corruption?](Russ.), Aug. 8, 2005,
<http://www.ckandal.info/main.html?news=1864>
 Kompania, Pchelinaiya okchota. V totalnoi bor'be s korruptsiei pobezdaet silneishii.
[Bees hunt. In a total war on corruption, only the strongest will win] (Russ.), Jan. 26,
2004, < http://www.compromat.ru/main/ne_rossiya/pchelin.htm >
 Yukos Minority Shareholder Coalition, <http://www.yukosshareholdercoalition.com.>
 http://www.indem.ru/corrupt/2005diag_press.htm
 Far East Center of Economic Education, Russian Foundation for Legal Reform,
<http://www.fecee.vladivostok.ru/FECEE/rflr.htm>
